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This study was focused on the relationship between board, composition, 
leadership structure and corporate performance. Drawing upon agency theory and 
stewardship theory -- two theories in the corporate governance research that have 
generally been viewed as countervailing with each other, the author developed two 
sets of competing hypotheses. A three-way classification scheme (inside / independent 
/ affiliated directors) regarding board composition was developed to capture the 
institutional characteristics of the boards of directors in Chinese firms. The 
hypotheses were tested with data from a sample of 203 Chinese shareholding 
6 、 
companies that made their initial public offering on the two domestic stock exchanges 
in 1996. Overall, stronger support was found for stewardship theory. Consistent with 
the prediction of stewardship theory, the proportion of affiliated directors was 
positively associated with firm performance while the board size was negatively 
associated with firm performance. Moreover, combined board leadership structure 
(operationalized as CEO duality) was found to have marginally significant effect on 
firm performance, which was in line with stewardship theory. For the agency theory 
hypotheses, only the positive relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and firm performance obtained weak support. However, the 
complementarity of these two theories in terms of board incentive was also identified 
from the positive relationship between affiliated directors' shareholding and firm 
performance. Implications of these findings for academic research and China's 
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CHAPTER lo INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has been studied by researchers from different 
disciplines (Turnbull, 1997). In particular, there has been accumulating literature on 
the board of directors - the most important internal governance mechanism (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson，1998). Previous research has established that the board 
of directors plays an important role in influencing organizational effectiveness, but 
theoretical perspectives differ about how the directors perform their duty (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). A popular line of inquiry in the board research focuses on the 
relationship between the structural factors of the board (e.g., board composition and 
leadership structure) and the effectiveness of the board. Similarly, opinions have 
varied regarding the ways to measure board composition and leadership structure 
(Daily, Johnson, & Dalton, 1999). It is suggested that these two issues ~ theoretical 
multiplicity and methodological ambiguity - might account for the mixed empirical 
findings about the relationship between board structure and firm performance. 
This study is focused on two influential theories in the area of corporate 
governance research - agency theory and stewardship theory. These two theories 
contradict with each other in their basic assumptions about human behavior and 
predictions about board effectiveness. Agency theory has its root in economics and 
assumes that human beings are self-serving and opportunistic by nature, whereas 
stewardship theory is rooted in psychological and social theories and assumes that 
human beings are proorganizational and trustworthy. Agency theory emphasizes that 
board independence should be the premise for governance effectiveness, whereas 
stewardship theory highlights the interdependence between the board and the firm 
management. The purpose of this study is thus to compare the two theories with 
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respect to the relationship between board structure and organizational outcome. 
Competing hypotheses are developed for this purpose. It is believed that such 
theoretical comparisons, if based on accurate operationalization and conducted in 
appropriate empirical settings, would greatly enhance our understanding of the forms 
and processes of corporate governance. 
The present study intends to compare agency theory and stewardship theory in 
the Chinese context. China offers an ideal setting for corporate governance research 
because of its unique institutional and cultural characteristics. In China, the emerging 
market rules and the long-held bureaucratic control have jointly created a tension that 
is worth being examined with different theoretical tools. Moreover, this study takes 
into consideration of the specific institutional factors facing Chinese firms and 
provides a context-specific method to measure board composition. 
The following chapters are organized in this way: Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review on the board of directors research with focus on board composition 
and leadership structure studies. Chapter 3 offers a description of China's major 
reform programs and the institutional factors that have influenced the corporate 
governance systems in Chinese firms. Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical background 
of the present study. Research questions and testable hypotheses are also proposed in 
Chapter 4. Research methodology is described in Chapter 5 and empirical results are 
reported Chapter 6. Chapter 7 is devoted to discussing the limitations of this study and 
some important issues associated with the research findings. 
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CHAPTER 2o LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate governance issues have been high on agenda of government 
legislation and academic research since the publication of Berle and Means's classic 
thesis on the separation of ownership from management in large corporations (Berle 
& Means, 1932). Given its multi-disciplinary nature, corporate governance was 
defined in a variety of ways. In very general terms, corporate governance was defined 
as “all the influences affecting the institutional processes, including those for 
appointing the controllers and / or regulators, involved in organizing the production 
and sale of goods and services" (Turnbull, 1997: 181). Some researchers defined 
corporate governance from corporate stakeholders' perspective. Mitchell, Agle and 
Wood (1997) defined corporate governance as "a relationship among stakeholders 
that is used to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of 
organizations." Stakeholders include shareholders, customers, competitors, 
employees, creditors and all the other groups that “are identified through the actual or 
potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing as a result 
of the firm's actions or inactions" (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In narrower terms, 
corporate governance can be defined as a set of institutional mechanisms aimed at 
protecting the shareholders' interests. These governance mechanisms include internal 
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mechanisms (e.g., ownership concentration, board of directors, executive 
compensation, and multidivisional structure) and external mechanism (e.g., market 
for corporate control) (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 1998: 355). Still, corporate 
governance has been discussed only in terms of the structure and functioning of 
boards of directors. In the present study, corporate governance was defined as a 
mechanism that specifies the relationship between the board of directors and the top 
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managers with the purpose of protecting shareholders' interests and improving the 
firm's performance. Donaldson (1990: 76) offered a definition very close to this point 
of view. He defined corporate governance as "the structure whereby managers at the 
organizational apex are controlled through the board of directors, its associated 
structures, executive incentive, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding.“ 
It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a comprehensive review on 
corporate governance literature. The following literature review is focused on two 
influential theoretical approaches to corporate governance, i.e., agency theory and 
stewardship theory, and relevant empirical studies. The purpose is to offer an 
overview of each theory's assumptions, research questions, theoretical arguments, and 
empirical evidence. 
2.1 Agency Theory Approach to Corporate Governance 
‘ . 
Agency theory emerged as one major component of organizational economics, 
a stream of research that attempts to link economic theory with organization studies 
(Barney & Ouchi, 1986). The researchers in organizational economics have showed 
deep interest in organizations, instead of markets, which has been the subject of most 
economic theories. Agency theory, in itself, is a powerful framework that has been 
used by scholars in a variety of fields (Eisenhardt, 1989). Followed is a review on 
agency theory's basic assumptions, main concepts and research concerns, and 
particularly, its arguments with regard to the board of directors. 
The intellectual root of agency theory can be traced back to work on property 
rights (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz，1972; Coase, 1937). Jensen and Meckling's article 
(1976) laid the foundation for contemporary agency theory. Different from neo-
classical economists, these property rights writers moved their attention from external 
market conditions to rights in the organizations established by contracts. A common 
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theme in their work is that a firm is "a set of contracts among factors of production, 
with each factor motivated by its self-interest" (Fama，1980: 289). Agency theory 
entered the field of corporate governance by stressing the importance of contracting at 
the top level of a company, i.e., the contract between the board of directors and the 
C E O � T h e contracting and related governance issues become necessary because in 
modem corporations ownership is separated from control (Berle & Means, 1932), 
Although the owners, typically the shareholders, hold voting rights on corporate 
» 
issues, they are usually too small and numerous to exercise their control over day-to-
day operation of the firm. Instead, the shareholders delegate the control authority to a 
board of directors, which in turn delegates it to the CEO and the top management 
team (TMT) (Hart, 1995). The separation of ownership and control, therefore, leads to 
a concern about the incentive problems on the part of managers. 
Many of agency theory's predictions rely on a set of assumptions about human 
nature, or specifically, managers' interests and incentives (Barney & Ouchi, 1986). 
Human beings are assumed to be boundedly rational, self-interested, risk-averse, and 
prone to opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989). Human beings are assumed to be 
“intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" (Simon, 1965: xxiv). They tend to seek 
self-interest, and this self-seeking orientation, in its strongest form, becomes 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985). 
In addition to these human behavior assumptions, agency theory also assumes 
that there would exist goal conflict and information asymmetry between the principal 
and the agent. These two assumptions are very important for understanding agency 
theory's prescriptions about governance effectiveness. It is assumed that the 
shareholders' interests rest in maximum profit compatible with a reasonable degree of 
risk, equitable distribution of profit among the shareholders, and maintenance of 
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market conditions that are favorable to investors (Warsh & Seward，1990). However, 
the managers might be more motivated to pursue financial gains, prestige, power, or 
the gratification of professional zeal (Burton, 2000; Myers, 1983). The managers also 
have more knowledge about corporate activities than do the directors and 
shareholders. This information asymmetry would put the shareholders in a more 
vulnerable situation. Given all these assumptions about human nature and 
organizational settings, agency theory predicts that managers would "shirk" from their 
duties, avoid risky strategies and take a short-term perspective towards investment for 
the sake of protecting their own interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
The focus of agency theory is on the principal-agent contract and the way in 
which the contract can be made most efficient from the principal's point of view 
(Nilakant & Rao, 1994). The primary objective is to minimize agency cost. So far the 
agency theorists have conducted research along two lines: positivist research and 
principal-agent research (Eisenhardt, 1989). The former stream of research focuses on 
identifying situations in which the principal and the agent are likely to have 
conflicting goals and proposing the governance mechanisms that serve to curb the 
agent's self-serving behavior. In comparison, the latter stream tends to be more 
abstract and mathematical and gives more attention to a general theory of "optimal 
contract." 
The positivist agency theory stresses various scenarios of agency relationship. 
Agency relationship was defined as "a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent" 
(Jensen & Meckling，1976: 308). The delegation of decision-making authority from 
the board to the CEO represents a typical scenario of agency relationship. 
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Agency relationship is always accompanied by agency problem, which refers 
to the possibility of managers' opportunistic behavior (Barney & Hesterly，1996; 
Ross, 1973). In the corporate governance domain, agency problems would happen 
when the CEO and / or the TMT work against the shareholders' interests. Agency 
problems are inevitable because "if both parities to the (agency) relationship are 
utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in 
the best interests of the principal" (Jensen & Meckling，1976: 308). It is costly to 
resolve agency problem. The cost incurred, namely agency cost, is equal to "the sum 
of the principal's monitoring expenditures, the agent's bonding expenditures, and any 
remaining residual loss" (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Agency theory addresses several major questions: Why would principals 
(shareholders) delegate authority to agents (managers) even though they know about 
the inevitable agency problems? What types of governance mechanisms can be 
enforced to minimize the agency problems? What types of bonding mechanisms can 
the agent use to reassure the principal? (Barney & Hesterly, 1996) 
As to the first question, Fama (1980) argued that the separation of ownership 
and control could be an efficient form of economic organization. The early theory of 
the firm held that there should be an entrepreneur who acts as both manager and risk-
bearer. As a manager, he is responsible for making decisions about day-to-day 
operation of the firm; as a risk-bearer, he has to accept the uncertain and possibly 
negative difference between total revenues and costs at the end of each production 
period (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). But Fama (1980) argued that to better understand 
modem corporations the manager's and the risk-bearer's functions should be seen as 
"naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm" (p. 289). In 
contemporary large corporations, managers typically are not the owners. Instead, the 
... .. t . 
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separation of ownership and management results in a model in which managers are 
responsible for coordinating activities within the organization while owners bear 
financial risk. The process of decision-making can thus be divided into two 
categories: decision management and decision control (Fama & Jensen，1983). The 
efficient economic arrangement is to assign the first role to the managers and the 
second to the risk-bearers, namely the shareholders. Under such an arrangement, 
managers' self-interest seeking behavior would be curbed given efficient capital 
market and managerial labor market, which can offer signals about corporate 
performance. 
The managerial labor market, the capital market, and the market for corporate 
control are known as external governance mechanisms. Obviously, agency theory's 
suggestion about the effectiveness of these mechanisms in solving agency problem is 
driven by a belief in market efficiency, rather than market failure (Barney & Ouchi, 
1986). However, the existence of external governance mechanisms does not eliminate 
the necessity of internal governance devices. Then it comes to the second question 
about the types of monitoring mechanisms. The agency literature has described in 
details how managers' behavior would cause agency problems. The principal's 
interests would be at damage in the face of the agent's moral hazard, which refers to 
the lack of effort on the part of the agent, and adverse selection, which refers to the 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Arrow, —1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
principal has two options in order to protect him/her from the agent's misbehavior: 
either directly monitoring the agent's behavior or inducing the agent to act in the 
interests of the principal. According to agency theory, agency problem could be 
reduced through both external and internal governance mechanisms, but the internal 
devices incur lower cost than the external devices (Fama, 1980). In other words, in 
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spite of the monitoring cost, the board of directors is seen as a cost-efficient 
governance mechanism. 
Besides monitoring cost, agency relationship also incurs bonding cost. As 
mentioned above, the external capital market and managerial labor market exert direct 
pressure on the managers and force them to work for the benefit of the shareholders. It 
is not surprising that the managers also have an incentive to demonstrate their 
孤 ：‘ 
commitment to the shareholders / board of directors. Bonding cost occurs when 
measures are taken to guarantee that the agent will not take certain actions which 
would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if the 
agent does take such actions (Jensen & Meckling，1976). In this sense the bonding 
mechanisms are mainly related to reward and punishment for the top managers. In 
large corporations, bonding mechanism often takes the form of executive 
compensation packages such as bonus, salary, shareholdings, and stock option plans 
(Barkema, 1995). -
In their review on board of directors research, Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
suggested that the board of directors should play three critical roles in a corporation: 
service, strategy, and control. Specifically, the board plays its service role by 
representing the firm's interests in community (Zald, 1969) and linking the firm with 
its external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik，1978). The strategic role of the board is 
reflected in its involvement in the firm's decision-making and strategy 
implementation (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Harrison, 1987). Among all the 
presumed functions of the board, agency theory treats "controlling" or "monitoring" 
as the most important board task (Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce，1989). The 
objective of board monitoring is to align the interests of managers and shareholders 
(Walsh & Seward，1990). It is in this sense that agency theory is a "control-based" 
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theory (Dalton et al., 1998). The board's major monitoring functions include the 
selection and/or replacement of top managers (especially the CEO) and evaluating / 
rewarding executive performance. The board serves as an important information 
system for monitoring executive behavior. It helps to bring the managers' interests 
and the shareholders' into congruence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, agency theory 
suggests that an independent board would fulfill its monitoring functions better than a 
non-independent board. 
To summarize previous discussion, agency theory emphasizes human beings' 
t 
self-serving behavior and pursuit for personal goals. A central issue in this theory is to 
reduce “conflict，，and "asymmetry" between the principal and the agent through 
efficient external market mechanisms and carefully designed internal governance 
devices. Typically agency problem is suggested to be solved with ex ante incentive 
contracts and ex post monitoring procedures. The ex post monitoring is especially 
important because individuals' bounded rationality and environmental uncertainty 
would render a perfect contract impossible. And the most qualified institutional 
— I . 
mechanism to perform the "check and balance" role would be an independent, 
objective board of directors (Hart, 1995). 
2.2 Stewardship Theory Approach to Corporate Governance 
Stewardship theory appeared as an opposition to agency theory. Donaldson, 
Davis and colleagues have been the most active proponents of this theory (Davis, 
Schoolman, & Donaldson，1997b; Donaldson, 1989，1990). Stewardship theory 
diverges from agency theory by questioning the latter's unrealistic, oversimplified 
assumptions and prescriptions about effective governance mechanisms.,On this basis, 
stewardship theorists propose their own suggestions on corporate governance. This 
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section is devoted to reviewing the key issues related to stewardship theory including 
its theoretical background, assumptions, basic research questions, and particularly its 
suggestions about governance mechanisms. Further issues regarding the similarities 
and differences between the two theories will be discussed later. 
The debate between agency theory and stewardship theory epitomizes the 
long-lasting debate between two important research traditions - economic approach 
and sociopsychological approach to organizational phenomena (Barney, 1990; 
Fligstein & Freeland，1995; Hirsch, Michaels, & Friedman，1987). Stewardship theory 
has its roots in sociological and psychological theories, which have provided 
descriptions about human needs and behaviors with much, richer texture than 
economic theories. Rather than being depicted as self-serving, opportunistic, narrow-
focused (on financial gains), and untrustworthy, human beings are assumed to have 
higher-order needs for self-esteem, self-actualization (Maslow, 1954), growth 
(Alderfer, 1972), and achievement and affiliation (McClelland, 1975). Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) used McGregor's (1960) Theory X and Theory Y 
to represent two different "models of man" that support agency theory and 
stewardship theory respectively. In the light of Theory Y，a manager is not an 
untrustworthy agent but a trustworthy steward "whose behavior is ordered such that 
proorganizational, collectivistic behaviors have higher utility than individualistic, self-
serving behaviors，，(Davis et al•，1997). Note that stewardship theory and agency 
theory disagree with each other not in the bounded rationality assumption but in the 
opportunism assumption. Stewardship theory stresses that the steward would like to 
cooperate with the principal and strive to improve the principal's welfare. Given the 
potential multiplicity of shareholders' objectives and multiple stakeholders, a 
steward's behavior can be considered organizational centered (Davis et al., 1997). In 
11 
other words, the steward has intrinsic motivation to improve organizational 
performance so as to satisfy most, if not all, groups of stakeholders. It is based on this 
model of "Theory Y man" that stewardship theorists argue that goal conflict would 
not be observed between the principal and the steward. This assumption is in sharp 
contrast to the agency assumption and then leads to quite different prescriptions about 
corporate governance practices. The descriptions of a pro-organizational steward do 
not imply that the steward does not have the so-called "survival" needs (Davis et ah, 
1997). Davis et al. (1997) gave a more accurate description of the steward's utility 
function: "The steward's opportunity set is constrained by the perception that the 
utility gained from pro-organizational behavior is higher than the utility that can be 
gained through individualistic, self-serving behavior" (Davis et al., 1997: 25). In this 
sense, the steward is rational when he directs his interest台 and motivations to 
organizational objectives. 
Therefore, the basic concern of stewardship theory is to identify the situations 
in which the interests of the principal and the steward are aligned. This assumption 
about manager-principal interest congruence is crucial for understanding stewardship 
theory. The ideal corporate governance model proposed by the stewardship theorists 
highlights such factors as involvement, trust, cooperation, intrinsic motivation, 
empowering structure, long-term relationship between the board and the managers, 
I • 
and so forth (Davis et al., 1997). This picture of corporate governance is opposite to 
what agency theory provides. While agency theory prefers an independent board with 
a greater proportion of outside directors and a leadership structure in which the 
positions of CEO and board chair are assumed by different persons, stewardship 
theory embraces the idea of an executive-dominant board and a combined leadership 
structure (Burton, 2000). 
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Recently, it appears that the stewardship theory proponents, to some extent, 
have modified their opinion of agency theory by moving from sever critique towards 
suggestions for "reconciling" the two theories (Davis et al.，1997; Donaldson, 1990). 
Instead of arguing for "one best way to corporate governance，，，they suggested that it 
would be more reasonable to identify the motivational and situational factors that 
determine choices between principal-agent relationship and prmcipal-steward 
relationship. The authors noted, "We attempt to reconcile the differences between 
stewardship and agency by describing the conditions under which each is necessary" 
(Davis et al., 1997: 21). This indicates a meaningful direction for future research. 
Agency theory and stewardship theory have been two influential approaches to 
corporate governance research. Certainly they are not the only approaches. In fact, the 
field of corporate governance has seen many other valuable theories such as resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik，1978)，managerial hegemony 
theory (Patton & Baker, 1987)，social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1997), and strategic contingency theory (Boyd, 1995; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). 
The list goes on. The present study is focused on comparing agency theory and 
stewardship theory, but the discourse is sometimes interwoven with other useful 
theoretical arguments for the purpose of building up a stronger theoretical foothold. 
2.3 Research on Board of Directors: Prescriptions and Empirical Evidence 
This section presents empirical evidence that—has been accumulated in the 
studies on boards of directors. Two major features of the board of directors - its 
composition and leadership structure have attracted previous researchers' attention. 
Board composition refers to "the size of the board and the mix of different directors' 
types (i.e., insiders vs. outsiders)” (Zahra & Pearce, 1989: 292). Board leadership 
13 
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structure has usually been discussed under the situation known as CEO duality. CEO 
duality means that the same person holds both the CEO and board chairperson 
positions in a corporation (Rechner & Dalton，1991). The interchangeable terms for 
this situation are combined leadership structure or single leadership structure. The 
opposite situation in which different persons assume the two positions is labeled CEO 
non-duality or separate leadership structure. 
Board composition and leadership structure have been the most researched 
board attributes in previous studies (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand， 
1996). The importance of this stream of research must be understood in the light of 
board reform - a movement that has swept through large US and UK corporations 
since the early 1980，s with the objective of restructuring the boards of directors 
(Geneen, 1984; Nader, 1984; Vance, 1983). Board reform was launched as a 
correction of worsening corporate governance in large corporations. With the 
involvement of active large shareholders and professional and regulatory bodies in 
corporate governance, several codes of practices for public companies have been 
issued (e.g.，Cadbury Committee, 1992). The board reformers' objective is to improve 
the board's accountability, independence and monitoring function. Since the board 
members' incentive and ability to monitor the managers are supposed to be influenced 
by structural characteristics of the board, the reform activists have centered their 
policy suggestions on greater outsider representation on the board and separate 
leadership structure (Burton, 2000; Kesner, Victor, & Lamont，1986; Lorsch & 
Maclver, 1989). These policy suggestions obviously follow the logic of agency theory 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1993). However, this logic has come> under questioning in 
recent years. Researchers have been challenging the "one best way" criterion of the 
board reform and stressing the importance of adopting multiple theoretical 
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perspectives for examining governance effectiveness (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; 
Frankforter, Berman, & Jones, 2000). The academic studies on board composition 
and leadership structure have been thriving for another practical reason — difficulty in 
collecting large-sample data on the processes and dynamics of boards of directors. 
Therefore, board structural attributes are usually used as "proxy" for board processes. 
Such a research practice can arguably find support in group dynamics theories that 
have established that group structure does influence group processes (Forsyth, 1999; 
Jackson, 1992; Moreland & Levine，1994). 
2.3.1 Board Composition Studies 
So far there have appeared a number of excellent review articles on board 
research (Dalton et al.，1998; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand，1996; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Overall, the researchers concluded that the empirical evidence about the effect 
of board composition/leadership structure has been mixed. A selected group of studies 
is listed in Appendix A. These studies focused on either board composition or board 
leadership structure (or both). Most studies examined the relationship between board 
characteristics and corporate financial performance, while some of them focused on 
other organizational outcomes (e.g., firm strategy, antitakeover measures or executive 
compensation). For those studies that examined multiple independent variables, only 
board composition and leadership variables are listed in Appendix A. 
Agency theory emphasizes the board's role in monitoring and controlling the 
CEO. It follows that effective boards should have more outside directors and/or 
separate leadership structure. The relevant empirical studies are summarized as 
follows. . 
15 
As far as board composition is concerned, the proportion of outside directors 
has been a key variable that many agency studies used to examine board 
‘ . 
effectiveness. Some studies offered support for the positive linkage between outsider 
representation and firm performance. For example, Ezzamel and Watson (1993) tested 
the outside directors' influence on firm's return on capital employed in a sample of 
113 UK corporations and found a positive and significant effect as predicted by 
agency theory. The positive effect of outsider representation has been partially 
supported in some other studies. For example, Barnhart, Man, and Rosenstein (1994) 
found significant curvilinear relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and firm performance (measured as market value to book value ratio), even 
after controlling for the level of managerial stock ownership. Wagner, Stimpeit, and 
Fubara (1998) found similar curvilinear effects in their meta-analysis of 29 studies (63 
correlations). Interestingly, they also found that the increasing presence of either 
outsiders or insiders was associated with higher performance. Consistent with agency 
theory, Rosenstein and Wyatt's study (1990) showed that the stock price positively 
reacted to the announcement of the appointment of an additional outside director. 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) found that on the corporate control market the bidding 
firms that realized high announcement-date abnormal returns had more independent ‘ ‘ 
outside directors on their boards. Kosnik (1987) found that the boards with more 
outside directors could effectively resist greenmail payment - a company's private 
repurchase of a block of its stock from a minority stockholder at a premium above the 
market price. A board that refuses to pay greenmail is able to protect shareholders' 
interest because greenmail payment is often seen as an entrenchment practice that 
managers use to resist potential takeover in order to protect their own jobs. There 
were reports that independent outside directors could help poor-performing firms 
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better reorganize their operations so as to avoid being acquired or liquidated (Daily, 
1995; Daily & Dalton，1994), 
However, there has been evidence against agency theory. Sundaramurthy 
(1996) found that if outside directors were "loyal" to the CEO, "which means that they 
were appointed by the CEO, they would be more likely to adopt anti-take over 
provisions, which would damage the shareholders' interests. Their observation is 
interesting because it raises further questions about the outside directors' incentive 
and behavior. Do all the outside directors behave in the same way as predicted by 
agency theory? It seems that the previous agency literature has given less attention to 
the potential behavioral difference among outside directors. Bay singer and Butler 
(1985) found no relationship between the percentage of independent directors on the 
board in 1970 and the relative profitability in the same year. Although they did find a 
positive relationship between board composition in 1970 and relative profitability in 
1980，they did not explain why it took such a long time for the effect to manifest 
itself. Fosberg (1989) examined outside directors' performance in monitoring 
management. He selected 127 pairs of firms that were similar in industry and size but 
different in the percentage of outside directors on the board and compared their 
financial performance. The result did not support the agency prediction about outside 
directors' role. Following agency theory, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel (1994) . . . � . . . ‘ .. 
hypothesized that the board with more independent directors would emphasize 
financial control over the CEO and this would cause the CEO to adopt risk-averse 
product diversification strategy. But they did not find support for this hypothesis in a 
sample of 203 US corporations. Quite a number of studies have concentrated on those 
critical events characterized by sharp principal-agent conflict in interests, especially 
those events related to antitakeover actions. The shareholders would be probably 
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benefited from the rising stock price when a bidding firm attempts to take over the 
firm. So agency theory suggests that the outside directors should play an active role in 
keeping the managers from adopting antitakeover measures. But this presumed role of 
i , 
outside directors has not been empirically confirmed in many studies. For example, 
Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) and Singh and Harianto (1989) found that the outsider-
dominated boards were more likely to adopt golden parachutes 一 a scheme that is 
generally seen as detrimental to the shareholders' interests. Similarly, Frankforter et 
al. (2000) and Young, Stedham, and Beekun (2000) did not found that the outsiders 
played the presumed role in resisting such arrangements as shark repellents or charter 
amendments. 
An increasing number of studies showed evidence just opposite to the agency 
prediction about the outside directors' positive influence over firm performance. 
Vance was perhaps among the earliest researchers who questioned the competence of 
outside directors in performing their designated role (Vance, 1964，1978, 1983). In an 
early study, Vance (1955) examined the financial performance of 200 large firms over 
a 25-year period. His original intention was to probe whether outside directors did a 
better job than inside directors. He found that firms with a majority of officer 
directors (insiders) had distinctly superior track records than those with a majority of 
outside directors. The same author's follow-up studies consistently .supported the 
argument that "there is no substitute for competent and dynamic internal 
management" (Vance, 1978: 219). Kesner (1987) identified a positive relationship 
between the proportion of inside directors and firm performance, too. He reported that 
higher insider representation was associated with greater profitability and higher asset 
utilization. In recent years, there have appeared more studies that directly compared 
agency theory and stewardship theory (e.g., Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Donaldson et 
“ 1 
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al., 1994; Fox & Hamilton! 1994; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Muth and Donaldson 
(1998)，for example, compared the predictive power of agency theory and stewardship 
theory with data from 145 top Australian listed companies. They found that board 
independence was negatively related to corporate performance, which was 
inconsistent with the prediction of agency theory. 
» 
Two issues in this abundant literature are worth attention. The first is related to 
measurement of board composition. Dalton et al. (1998) identified four different 
approaches to measuring board composition: inside, outside, affiliated, and 
independent/interdependent directors. It is noted in Appendix A which study adopted 
which operationalization method. Board composition is usually operationalized as the 
proportion of a certain type of directors in all the directors. While the denominator is 
consistent in all the operationalizations (the total number of directors), the numerator 
varies notably when different formulae are used to capture .the meaning of each 
operationalization scheme. Daily et al. (1999) found no fewer than 20 
operationalizations of board composition after examining the extensive board 
literature. A big issue is how to choose the appropriate measurement that can best 
reflect the researcher's theoretical concern. Different theories may require different 
operationalizations of board composition. The selection of measurement must be 
linked with the specific roles of the board that the researcher is to discuss. The second 
issue is the need for testing multiple theories. Agency theory has dominated the 
corporate governance research area for a long time. But since the empirical evidence 
has not converged on agency predictions, it calls for attention to alternative theoretical 
explanations. A number of studies have made efforts to examine the role and 
effectiveness of boards with theoretical lenses other than agency theory (e.g., 
Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold’ 2000; Judge & Zeithaml，1992; Young et al., 2000). 
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These two issues - appropriate measurement of board composition and theoretical 
multiplicity - will be further addressed in the present study. 
Board size has been another well-researched structural factor in board studies 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand，1999). The belief that group size influences 
group behavior is rooted in the group dynamics literature (Moreland & Levine，1994). 
However, there has been no theoretical consensus regarding the relationship between 
board size and organizational outcomes. The empirical evidence about the effects of 
board size has been equivocal, too. Some studies have found support for the "larger 
board - better performance" hypothesis. Dalton et al. (1999) conducted a meta-
analysis on the relationship between board size and performance. After examining 
131 samples, they concluded that there was systematic evidence of nonzero, positive, 
true population estimates of board size - performance relationships. However, they 
also noted that different theories would explore the size effect from different 
perspectives. Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985) found that non-failed firms in 
tlieir sample had larger boards than the failed firms. On the 'contrary, the "smaller 
board - better performance" prediction has been supported in other studies. Herman 
(1981) reported that Fortune 500 boards were too big to conduct effective discussion. 
Yermack (1996) reported an inverse association between board size and market 
valuation in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 
1991. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) confirmed Yermack's findings by 
examining the board size effect in a sample of small and medium-sized Finnish firms. 
They found a negative relationship between board size-and firm's profitability. 
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2.3.2 Board Leadership Structure Studies 
Again, the studies on board leadership structure have not reached any 
consistent conclusion. As in the case of board composition, agency theory and 
stewardship theory arrive at different propositions about the effect of CEO duality. 
The corporate governance reformers have been worried about the power and influence 
of a single CEO-chairperson. Many view board leadership structure as the single most 
important determinant of board outcomes (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). CEO duality has 
come under scrutiny from both board reform advocates and opponents (e.g., Anderson 
& Anthony，1986; Geneen, 1984; Lorsch & Maclver，1989). One important reason for 
this concern is the fact that a large proportion of American corporations keep a CEO 
duality structure (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao，1996). Agency theorists oppose to CEO 
duality on the ground that a single CEO-chairperson would reduce board 
independence (Fama & Jensen，1983; Fizel & Louie, 1990). In contrast, stewardship 
theorists and some strategic management researchers propose that firms would be 
benefited from a single leadership structure because it permits unity of command, 
clear-cut strategy, and efficient strategic implementation (Anderson & Anthony， 
1986; Donaldson, 1989). 
Corresponding to the theoretical debate are mixed empirical findings. On the 
side of agency theory, some studies showed that non-duality firms outperformed 
duality firms (e.g., Pi & Timme, 1993; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Quite a number of 
studies focused on the stock market reaction to a firm's aimouncement of changing its 
leadership structure (from duality to non-duality or vise versa). According to agency 
theory, the stock market would react negatively to a firm's move into a single 
leadership structure because it would be interpreted—as a signal of reduced board . ‘ 
effectiveness. In a study on the relationships between governance mechanisms and the 
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market reaction to antitakeover charter amendments, Malekzadeh, McWilliams, and 
Sen (1998) found that the market reacted increasingly negatively to the amendment 
announcements when the firm had a single leadership structure. This result was 
consistent with agency theory. With respect to the relationship between CEO duality 
and financial performance, Boyd (1995) and Rechner and Dalton (1991) reported 
evidence consistent with agency theory (i.e., a negative link). However, agency 
propositions were not supported in other studies (e.g., Baliga et al., 1996; Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993; Donaldson & Davis，1991; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Sridharan & 
John, 1998). 
Still, there have been studies that did not find any real performance differences 
between the firms with single leadership structure and the' firms ‘ with separate 
leadership structure (e.g., Chaganti et al., 1985; Daily & Dalton, 1992). One unique 
feature of Daily and Dalton's study (1992) is that it was conducted in a sample of 100 
fast-growing small firms, while most governance researchers have selected samples 
from large corporations. The result of their study showed no performance difference 
between two types of leadership structures, however. 
Some researchers tried to integrate the two conflicting views of CEO duality 
by considering contingent factors. For example, Beyd (1995) suggested that the 
relationship between board leadership structure and firm performance would be 
moderated by the environmental forces facing the firm. He incorporated Dess and 
Beard's (1984) three environmental dimensions (munificence, dynamism, and 
complexity) as moderators, and the overall results demonstrated that an independent, 
positive relationship between CEO duality and performance still existed after 
controlling for environmental interactions. Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) proposed a 
more complicated contingency model with respect to CEO duality. Different from 
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most other studies, these authors explored antecedents to CEO duality. Drawing upon 
both agency theory and organization theory, they argued that the proposed duality-
board vigilance link would be influenced by informal CEO power and the firm's 
previous performance, along with such contextual factors as industry, firm size, 
strategic focus, nonproduction overhead, and CEO shareholdings. 
Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) emphasized that CEO duality could be a 
"double-edged sword." It effect is dependent upon other contingency factors. This 
argument seems to have been underscored in a few recent studies in which interaction 
effects between CEO duality and board composition were identified (e.g., Coles & 
Hesterly, 2000; Mallette & Fowler，1992). Mallette and Fowler (1992) argued that the 
probability that a board would adopt a poison pill provision (another antitakeover 
measure) depends on the interactive effect of CEO-duality and the proportion of 
• ' .1 
independent directors. Although a board with a single leader is more likely to adopt a 
poison pill provision, the likelihood decreases as the proportion of independent 
directors increases. A balance of power could be achieved through such a "balanced" 
board design. Cole and Hesterly (2000) continued exploring the possibility of 
interactive effect between different board structural factors. They argued that board 
leadership structure takes place within the context of other governance arrangements, 
which is indicative of interaction effect. And the empirical evidence from these 
authors' work showed support for the interaction hypothesis. 
�.‘ * 
Like the board composition studies, the measurement of board leadership 
structure, which was usually considered obvious and straightforward, has been 
questioned by some researchers as being inadequate in reflecting fully the power 
relationship between the CEO and the board (Coles & Hesterly，2000; Harris & 
Helfat, 1998). A 3-way classification of board leadership structure has been proposed 
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to replace the previous 2-way distinction (Coles & Hesterly，2000). The new scheme 
has three types: single structure (i.e., CEO duality), separate and independent 
structure (the chairperson is an independent outside director), and separate but non-
independent structure (the chairperson is an affiliated director). However, this 
conceptualization has not been examined carefully due to its newness. The 
dichotomous variable (single or separate structure) is still the dominant way to 
.. * ； 
operationalize board leadership structure. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a brief review on two influential theoretical approaches 
to corporate governance research, i.e., agency theory and stewardship theory. The 
major differences between the two theories are discussed. The empirical evidence (or 
lack of evidence) for each theory is also reviewed in this chapter. On the whole, the 
previous studies have offered mixed evidence about the effects of different types of 
> ... 
board composition and leadership structure. It is this complexity that set the starting 
point for the present study. 
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CHAPTER 3. REFORM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
A CHINESE CASE 
It has been more than 20 years since China first launched its "open door" 
reform policy. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been in the center of the reform 
scene. This chapter offers a brief review on the major SOE reform policies. The 
emphasis is on the corporatization scheme, under which many SOEs have been 
transformed into shareholding companies (or joint-stock companies as called in 
China's Company Law). Of particular interest is the institutional arrangements aimed 
to "create" owners / shareholders for China's new shareholding companies. One of 
these arrangements involved creating a multitiered state assets management system 
across the country. Various state assets holding companies (SAHCs) were established 
to represent the state on the corporate boards. Another arrangement was to authorize 
some large enterprise groups {''qiye jituan ") or existing SOEs to "represent the state" 
in overseeing the assets that are theoretically owned by the state but practically 
controlled by these enterprises. The special-purpose SAHCs and authorized 
enterprises represented two typical institutional arrangements for creating "corporate 
owners." These practices have produced significant impact on the corporate 
governance structure of Chinese companies. 
This chapter provides a brief description of the institutional context in which 
China's governance reform is taking place. The first section is a bird's eye view of the 
major enterprise reform schemes that China has implemented in the SOEs since 1978. 
The second section describes how the state assets management system has worked 
and how it has impacted Chinese companies' governance structure. The last section is 
devoted to the typical modes of asset restructuring that Chinese shareholding 
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companies have followed for the purpose of establishing a "marketized" ownership 
structure. Attention is focused on how these assets restructuring modes have 
influenced corporate governance arrangements in Chinese emerging shareholding 
companies. 
3.1 China's Enterprise Reform: An Overview 
Generally speaking, China's industrial reform was initially focused on 
decentralizing the decision-making autonomy to the SOEs without fundamentally 
restructuring the property rights relationship between the government and the SOEs 
(Du & Zhang, 1999). However, the decentralization-oriented reform has gradually 
* . . 
been replaced by a new reform program labeled "modem corporate system" Cxiandai 
qiye zhidu") since the early 1990，s. The SOE reform process can be roughly divided 
into three stages, each characterized by different objectives and practices (Luo, 1999). 
Stage 1: 1978 - 1984. The reform practices during the early stage were 
centered on increasing the SOE profitability by means of incentive plans. During this 
period a variety of arrangements appeared with the goal of adjusting the income 
distribution relationship between the supervisory government agencies and the 
enterprise. The first reform plan ~ the profit retention system {''lirun liucheng") was 
introduced in 1979. The enterprise was allowed to retain a certain portion of its profits 
for upgrading technology and rewarding employees. In 1983，a ‘‘tax for profit” (“"• gai 
shui") system was implemented in SOEs. Enterprises were required to pay tax 
according to some predetermined rates (55% for large and medium-sized SOEs) 
instead of remitting profits (Smyth, 1998). Meanwhile, the scope of the mandatory 
production plans began to shrink due to the implementation of the "dual-track" price 
system d'jiage shuanggui zhV"). This system allowed the SOEs to sell their products 
. » 
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in excess of the state-set output plan at market price (Wu, 1997). In sum, the 
enterprise reform during this period was intended to expand enterprise autonomy and 
managerial incentives. 
Stage 2: 1985 - 1992. A variety of managerial responsibility systems were 
» • 
introduced in this period. The first significant component of the reform package was 
the “Factory Director Responsibility System” {"changzhang fuzezhi"), which was 
experimented in the early 1980，s and adopted by over 90 percent of all the SOEs by 
the end of the decade (Lin, 1992). Under this system, the SOE manager was 
demanded to assume full responsibility for the factory and granted with more power 
in handling the affairs of the enterprise (Chen & Faure，1995). In 1985, the 
government decided to stop appropriating financial grants to the SOEs. From then 
onward bank loans became the main financing source for most SOEs. This reform 
move, known as “loan for financial appropriation” {''bo gai dai”）, was initially 
designed with the objective of strengthening the SOEs' awareness of financing risk 
(Zhao, 1999). It was only years later that the government recognized that such a plan 
led to the heavy debt burden of the SOEs, which now makes the establishment of 
sound corporate governance system even more difficult. As a matter of fact, the 
government is now desperately seeking for a solution to SOEs' debt problem. 
A “ Contract Responsibility System (CRS) ” Cchengbao hetongzhV) was 
promoted as a refined managerial responsibility system. Thfe SOE • manager was 
requested to enter into a contract on behalf of the enterprise with the supervisory 
government agencies (e.g., industrial bureau, financial bureau, tax bureau, state-
owned financial institutions etc.). The contract typically specified that the enterprise 
should submit a certain amount of profit to the government; as a return, the 
government would grant the enterprise with decision-making power over such matters 
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as production arrangement, price setting, purchase of inputs, sales, labor deployment 
and wage schemes. By the end of 1988, the CRS was implemented in 91 percent of all 
large SOEs (Luo, 1999). A number of important laws were promulgated in this 
period, including the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (1987) and the Enterprise Law 
(1988), At the time the enterprise manager obtained considerable decision autonomy, 
but the government still exerted control of some degree over the enterprises. The SOE 
and its governmental supervisors could determine the terms and conditions of the 
contract, however, only after long and exhausting negotiation (Yang, 1990). It was 
these negotiations and bargainings that aroused the public attention to the agency 
problems in SOEs for the first time. 
Stage 3: 1993 till now. The reform measures that had been in place till then 
helped improve enterprise profitability but causes just as many problems. China's 
reform moved into a new stage in the early 1990’s. The most important reform policy 
in this stage was the shareholding system (or corporatization scheme)： Although the 
CRS had encouraged the enterprise managers to improve productivity and 
profitability, it invited some unexpected problems. Managerial efforts did not always 
lead to high economic performance because the state still controlled price and 
procurement/sales in some industries, which undermined the managers' incentives. 
The face-to-face negotiation process could be exhausting for both parties. There were 
reports that some factory managers deliberately evaded the control of their 
supervising agencies. Many enterprises attempted to advance their own goals or 
. . . . . . » 
interests by directing their economizing efforts to the organizational outcomes 
unintended by their principals (Lin, 1992). 
The shareholding system emerged as early in the mid-1980's mainly as a 
response to the failure of previous reform efforts. The first shareholding company -
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Beijing Tianqiao Department Store Company was established in July 1984 (Ma, 
1995). In 1988，the State Commission for Economic System Reform (SCESR) 
allowed the enterprise groups to experiment with shareholding system (T. Zhu, 1999). 
The shareholding reform gained unprecedented momentum after Deng Xiaoping's 
famous speech on his "tour to the south" in early 1992. In the same year the central 
government issued the ‘‘Regulations on Transforming the Management Mechanisms 
of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises”, emphasizing enterprise autonomy, economic 
liberalization, and a further separation of government administration from enterprise 
management (Wu, 1997). The Regulations stipulated that SOEs should become legal 
entities that take responsibility for their own business operations, profits and losses, 
self-development and self-monitoring (Zhao, 1999). 
Generally, Chinese official press and academic researchers refer to the year of 
1993 as the starting point of the corporatization reform, when the government 
approved the “Decisions of the CCP Central Committee on Issues Concerning the 
Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic System''. This was a milestone 
document in which the CCP gave up the centrally planned economic system in favor 
of a "socialist market economy" and set out long-term objectives for the 
corporatization reform. A centerpiece was to transform SOEs into limited liability 
corporations or shareholding companies with clearly defined property rights structure 
of multiple ownership. The criteria behind the "modern enterprise system" were 
described as "clearly established ownership, well-defined power and responsibility, 
separation of enterprise from administration, and scientific management" (Zhao, 
1999). 
The ongoing corporatization reform represents a "jump" in the reform logic ~ 
after all the previous experiments, the government finally decided to tackle the core of 
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the public ownership system (Ma, 1998). In 1995 the Chinese government further 
elaborated its strategy for the corporatization reform. The main strategies include 
"taking a firm grip of large SOEs and letting go of the small ones" Czhuadai 
fangxiao''), and "reform, reorganization, renovation and strengthening management" 
(known as “sangai yi jiaqiang"). The government decided to withdraw from 
inherently competitively structured industries where small and medium sized SOEs 
predominate whereas maintaining control over large SOEs in strategic industries. One 
important objective is to strengthen corporate governance of the companies on the 
basis of a clear property rights structure. The corporatization program was endorsed at • ‘ 
the CCP's Fifteenth Congress in September 1997 and has become the main theme of 
China's enterprise reform since then. 
3.2 State as Shareholder: The State Assets Management System 
To get in-depth understanding of the governance issues in Chinese SOEs, it is 
necessary to take a look at the institutional framework that defines the state's role as 
the owner of the SOEs and its relationship with the SOEs. The main component of 
this framework and the focus of this section is the so-called "state asset management .. ‘ 
system.，，This is a multitiered system that involves governmental administration 
bureaus at both central and local levels and state asset holding companies (SAHC) 
{guoyou zichan konggu gongsi) in various forms (Jiang, 1995; Liu, 1998; The World 
Bank, 1997; Zhang, 1996). There was opinion that the establishment of this 
multitiered system constitutes "the most comprehensive and visible aspect in China's 
new era of SOE reforms，，(McNally & Lee，1998): 33). 
In China, the State, or its agents, is expected to carry out "shareholder" 
functions performed by private owners in market economic system. This is because 
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the Chinese government wishes to improve SOE performance and maintain state 
ownership in key industries simultaneously. The state asset management system was 
set up to achieve two main policy goals: "separating governmental and business 
functions" and "state asset preservation and increase" (The World Bank, 1997). 
Specifically, there were four principles that guided the design of China's state asset 
management system, i.e., unified state ownership, classified management, authorized 
operation and division of supervision (The Central Committee of the CCP, 1999). 
Figure 1 describes the organizational structure of this system. At the highest level, the 
National People's Congress and the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) represent the people of China, theoretically, as the owner of all state assets. 
The State Council, in practice, is responsible for administering the assets. In the pre-
reform ear the State Council further delegated authority over state assets to the 
industrial ministries. This administrative system was changed in the reform era 
because the central government began to realize the importance of severing the 
administrative link between the ministries and the SOEs. It was then decided that the 
power in managing state assets should be centralized into one single department. In 
January 1988 the National Administrative Bureau of State-Owned Property 
(NABSOP) was established (China Market Economy Research Institute, 1998). The 
NABSOP take on a range of responsibilities: drafting regulations, compiling statistical 
reports, defining property rights, evaluating assets, supervising asset preservation and 
appreciation, formulating performance targets, appraising performance, and resolving 
property rights disputes over state assets (The World Bank, 1997). The counterparts of 
the NABSOP at the provincial / municipal level are local state asset management 
bureaus or commissions, which accept guidance from the NABSOP but also report to 
the local governments. 
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Figure 1. China's State Asset Management System 
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Since the NABSOP and the local state asset management bureaus are still 
government organs, they should not act as shareholders of companies according to the 
reform criterion of "separating government from enterprises. “ The government's role 
is defined as "performing the functions of shareholders in SOEs or State shareholding 
companies via its designated representatives, enjoying the rights to share profits from 
assets，making major decisions and selecting managers in accordance with the scale of 
investment, and bearing limited responsibilities for enterprises' debts" (The Central 
Committee of the CCP, 1999). Therefore, there is need to create such "designated 
representatives" or "intermediate organizations" that are supposed to be independent, 
market-driven corporations themselves. As shown in_Figure 1，four major types of 
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intermediate organizations have emerged since the late 1980，s: sectoral general 
corporations (hangye zonggongsi), SAHCs transformed from previous local bureaus, 
authorized enterprise groups, and "pure" SAHCs. Generally speaking, they are all 
SAHCs in that they are expected to represent the state and hold shares in numerous 
SOEs. The SAHCs are to form a "screen that parts the state's bureaucracy from SOE 
management" (McNally & Lee, 1998: 35). In this sense their mission is to act as a 
"personalized" representative of the state. Followed is discussion on the institutional 
origin and operation mechanism of each type of SAHC. 
The first category of SAHC includes major sectoral general corporations. 
These general corporations were equivalent to industrial ministries in that they were 
granted the power to control the industry-level production. The general corporations 
are found mainly in strategically important industries such as petrochemical, aviation . . . . ‘ 
and non-ferrous metal industry. A number of such general corporations have been 
converted to SAHCs (Liu, 1998). 
The second category of SAHC was actually transformed from previous 
industrial bureaus at the provincial / municipal level. The so-called "Shanghai model" 
offered an example in this regard (McNally & Lee, 1998). In Shanghai, six previous 
industrial bureaus were transformed into SAHCs. They were wholly state-owned 
corporations (guoyou duzi gongsi) and report to the Shanghai State Assets 
Administration Committee 一 the local counterpart —of NABSOP. Although these 
SAHCs are expected to be commercial corporations, there have been reports that they 
virtually retain their governmental roles and their behavior have been of little 
difference from before. For these "industrial bureau-based" SAHCs, what happened 
was no more than a name change. They were reported to have dealt with the 
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enterprises basically in the same way as the governmental agencies dealt with the 
enterprises in the past (The World Bank, 1997). 
The enterprise groups belong to the third category of SAHC. These enterprise 
groups were authorized by the state asset administration authority to "operate" the 
state assets in their custody. Since the 1980，s the government has initiated a series of 
programs in an effort to establish enterprise groups. In the early 1990's the 
government decided to experiment the shareholding system in a selected group of 
enterprise groups in predominantly heavy industries (The World Bank, 1997). 
According to the Company Law (1994), most of the enterprise groups were 
transformed into wholly state-owned companies or limited liability companies. They 
became "coalitions of firms, bound together by varying degree of legal and social 
connection, that generally conduct business in more than one market under the control 
of a dominant, or core firm，，(Keister, 1999: 7). As more enterprise groups were 
included in the corporatization program, they obtained authorization Cshouquan") 
from the government to exercise, on behalf of the state, the ownership rights over a 
group of SOEs under their control. They were responsible for the preservation and 
appreciation of the asset value. Some enterprise groups were listed on the stock 
exchange or had subsidiaries listed on the exchange. 
The last category of SAHC was known as "pure" SAHC because they were 
newly registered corporations with the essential mission of overseeing the state assets 
that were widely dispersed in the SOEs of various industries (Liu, 1998). Different 
from the enterprise groups, the pure SAHCs themselves did not get involved in any �. ‘ 
form of productive activities. In this sense they were more like financial holding 
companies. 
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The relationships between these SAHCs and numerous^ SOEs constitute the 
operational level landscape of the state asset management system. At this level, the 
SAHC plays the role as the majority shareholder (in the case of limited liability 
companies and listed shareholding companies) or the sole owner (in the case of 
wholly state-owned enterprises), and sends representatives to the board of directors in 
their subsidiary companies. 
The multitiered state asset management system highlights an important feature 
of China's corporatization reform: the government's top-down approach to 
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influencing the ownership structure, and in turn, the corporate governance 
arrangements in Chinese shareholding companies. It is important to understand this 
institutional background and its impacts on the incentive and behavior of various 
"state representatives" (in this case, various forms of SAHCs). 
3.3 Asset Restructuring before IPO 
The previous section offers a description of the institutional framework in 
which the most powerful shareholder of Chinese companies, the state, exerts its 
control over the companies. However, questions remain regarding how the other 
shareholders enter the landscape. Specifically, how is the ownership structure 
constructed when a SOE is converted to a shareholding company? This is an issue 
related to the "operation mechanisms" that Chinese SOEs have applied to clarify their 
property rights and corporate governance arrangements. This section will describe 
various methods the companies have used to "restructure" their assets {zichan 
chongzu) in order to be qualified for incorporating and then listing on the stock 
exchange. It is argued that the way of reorganizing assets could, to a large extent, 
influence the composition and process of the boards of directors in the companies. 
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China's first Company Law was effective as of July 1, 1994. The 
specifications with respect to corporate governance in the Company Law are deeply 
influenced by the Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Tarn, 2000). The 
legal requirements about incorporation, in particular, call for careful examination. 
Some of these requirements are listed as follows, which help to clarify some terms 
(e.g., sponsor) that will be used hereafter and provide background information about 
the asset restructuring process - the focus of this section. 
(Extracted from Chapter 3 - Incorporation and Organizational Structure of Joint Stock 
Limited Companies, Company Law of People's Republic of China) 
"Article 73: To incorporate a joint stock limited company, the following conditions must be 
satisfied: ‘ 
(1) the number of sponsors shall conform to the statutory number; 
(2) the share capital subscribed for by the sponsors and raised from the general public 
shall reach the statutory minimum amount of capital; 
(3) the issuance of shares and preparations for incorporation shall be in conformity with 
the provision of the law; 
(4) the articles of association of the company shall be formulated by the sponsors and 
adopted at the inaugural meeting; 
(5) the company shall have a name and an organizational structure required for the 
incorporation of a joint stock limited company; and 
(6) the company shall have fixed premises and the necessary conditions for production 
and operation." (p. 55) 
"Article 74: Joint stock limited companies may be incorporated by means of sponsorship or 
by means of share offer. 
'In corporation by means of sponsorship' means incorporation of a company by 
means of subscription by the sponsors for all the shares to be issued by the company. 
'Incorporation by means of share offer' means incorporation of a company by means 
of subscription by the sponsors for a portion of the shares to be issued by the company and 
offer of the rest to the general public." (p. 57) 
"Article 75: To incorporate a joint stock limited company, there shall be five or more 
sponsors, of which more than half must have their domicile within the territory of the People's 




Where a State-owned enterprise is restructured as a joint stock limited company, 
there may be less than five sponsors, however, such a company shall be incorporated by 
means of share o f f e r , (p. 57) 
"Article 80: The sponsors may make their capital contributions in cash, or with material 
objects, industrial property rights, non-patented technology or land-use rights at their 
appraised value. ... (omitted)" (p. 61) ‘ ‘ 
Here it is worth some space to discuss the ownership structure of. a typical 
Chinese company. It is often difficult for an outsider to understand the ownership 
structure with the "Chinese characteristics" because the shares issued by a company 
are classified into different categories with different levels of "tradability." Previous 
researchers have noted the sometimes confusing classifications of shares in China 
(e.g., He, 1998; Sun & Huang, 1999; Wu, Xiang，& ？hang，1996; Xu & Wang，1999). 
According to who owns them, the shares can be classified into five types: state shares 
(“guo jia gu"), legal person sha re s�“fa ren gu"), employee shares ("nei bu zhi gong 
gu"), individual shares (“ge ren gu"), and foreign shares {"wai zi gu"). State shares 
are typically owned by the state asset management bureaus or the industrial bureau-
based SAHCs. Legal person shares are owned by SOEs, financial institutions, and 
other non state-owned companies or institutions. Employee shares are held by the 
employees (including the top managers) of the shareholding company. Individual 
shares are issued to the general public on the stock market, while the foreign shares 
» ‘ 
are issued to foreign institutions. According to whether they can be traded on the 
open market, the shares can be classified into non-tradable (mainly state and legal 
person shares) and tradable (others) shares. According to where they are issued and 
traded, the shares are classified into A shares (domestic), B shares (traded on the 
domestic stock exchanges but denominated in US dollars), H shares (traded in HK), N 
shares (in New York), etc. As specified in the Company Law (cited above), a 
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shareholding company must have one or more sponsors, which in most cases are 
SOEs and/or banks and financial institutions. The shares held by the sponsor(s) are 
legal person shares, but in the company's IPO statement these shares are sometimes 
noted as sponsor-held shares (Ja qi ren giO. After the company gets listed on the 
open capital market, other companies may buy the company's A shares and thus 
become the company's legal person shareholders. In brief, this complicated ownership 
structure takes its original shape during the asset restructuring process. Ownership 
structure has been addressed in numerous studies, however, research on Chinese 
corporate governance issues would be further enriched if the researcher takes into 
account the history and process through which the ownership structure takes its shape. 
A SOE had to go through the asset restructuring process when it was 
transformed into a shareholding company. This step was especially important if the 
shareholding company later intended to get its shares listed on the stock exchange 
(Chen, 1997). The so-called sponsors played an important role in tl^ e restructuring 
process. The above statements invite two issues. Who would be the sponsors"! How 
would the sponsors initiate the asset restructuring process and shape the corporate 
governance structure of the to-be-incorporated enterprise? The English literature 
sheds little light on these issues except for a few descriptive studies (e.g., Aharony, 
Lee, & Wong, 2000). The Chinese literature provides more insights in this regard 
(Liang & Wu，1998; Liu & Gao, 1999; Shao, 2000; Tokuchi & Wang，1994). This 
study is focused on the asset restructuring activities before the company's initial 
public offering (IPO). ‘ 
Of interest is how a SOE was restructured as a shareholding company. Since 
most Chinese listed companies were transformed from old SOEs, it is especially 
important to demystify this "black box." Five main modes of IPO-related asset 
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restructuring have been documented (Shao, 2000; Tokuchi & Wang，1994), The five 
modes distinguish with each other mainly in the methods that the SOE used to deal 
with its productive and non-productive assets and the institutional arrangements that 
shaped the relationship between the old SOE and the emerging shareholding 
company. The old SOE might either discontinue or continue to exist after the asset 
restructuring. Also, the restructuring might occur either to a SOE/enterprise group as a 
whole or to subsidiary(ies) of an enterprise group. In either situation, the restructuring 
has impacted the enterprise' structure and process in a way that none of the previous 
reform programs could have compared. Chinese old SOEs were known for providing 
their employees with "cradle-to-grave" welfare benefits (Warner, 1987; T. Zhu, 
1999). To meet that socialist obligation, the SOE had to maintain a range of non-
productive facilities such as hospital, school, canteen, library, and so on for its 
employees' benefit. These not-for-profit facilities have come to be seen as the 
enterprises' social burden. Therefore, it is a key issue to dispose these non-productive 
assets for a SOE that seeks listing. 
Public offering of corporate shares is in the joint control of several central 
government agencies. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the 
top authority that is responsible for regulating the stock market. In China; the total 
number of new stocks to be listed in the exchanges is determined under a quota 
scheme. The annual quota is usually equally distributed among the provinces, and the 
provincial industrial / financial departments are responsible for recommending the 
candidates for the new listings. The final decision is made at the central level, mainly 
based on a comprehensive report of the firm's condition including its management, 
financial position (especially financial performance during the three years prior to the 
stock issuance), the strategic importance of the industrial sector in which the firm 
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operates, and so on. Other important considerations include current government 
policies and the stock market condition (Ma, 1997). Once a firtn is approved to issue 
shares by means of public offering, it has to adjust its asset and liability structure so as 
to meet the legal requirements for a shareholding company. According to the 
Company Law, a shareholding company may be established either through 
sponsorship or through public offering. Many Chinese firms chose to first incorporate 
under a sponsorship arrangement and then went public. At any rate it is a necessary 
step to restructure the firm's assets. 
As mentioned above, there have appeared five modes of asset restructuring 
(Shao, 1998). The first mode is labeled "complete transformation" Czhengti gaizu"). 
It refers to the process in which the old SOE is incorporated with all its assets 
transferred to the new company. This method has been adopted by some SOEs that 
are relatively young and have lighter "social burden. “ In this mode, the old SOE 
discontinues to exist after the restructuring process. 
The second mode is labeled "one (enterprise) into t w o ” � ‘ y i fen wei er"), in 
which the old SOE would be divided into two legally independent yet economically 
related business entities. One is the listed shareholding company that would appear to 
own all or major productive facilities of the old SOE. The other is a company that 
would operate the non-productive assets of the old SOE. Similarly, the old SOE 
"disappears" in this case. The state ownership right in the listed company is usually 
transferred to an upper-level government agency or a SAHC that used to control the 
old SOE. 
The third mode of asset restructuring is known as "main-body restructuring" 
Czhuti gaizu"). Similar to the second mode, only the productive facilities would be 
transferred to the listed company. But the two modes are different in that in "main-
、： ‘ .. 
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body restructuring," the old SOE continues to be in business. And in most cases, it 
would appear as the holding company of the listed company upon the completion of 
the asset restructuring process. Note that the old SOE is often the leading sponsor, 
‘ I 
sometimes the single sponsor, in the incorporation process. It might be joined by other 
institutions as co-sponsors. This mode has its advantage because the old SOE (now 
the holding company) can still maintain its links with important environmental 
resources (e.g., governmental connections, preferential policies, and supplier 
relations), which would also benefit the listed company. 
The fourth mode, labeled "component restructuring" Cbufen gaizu"), has been 
found in the enterprise groups' asset restructuring. A typical Chinese enterprise group 
composes of many enterprises at three levels: the parent company (core enterprise), 
wholly owned subsidiaries, and affiliated enterprises (Tokuchi & Wang，1994). If the 
case is that the parent company is to be listed on the stock exchange, the common 
» 
practice is to restructure the parent company so that all subsidiaries engaged in the 
same business of the parent would be incorporated in the parent company. The listed 
company would then be established on the basis of main "components" of the 
enterprise group's businesses. The business relationships among subsidiaries are more 
complicated in this case. However, similar as in the above two modes, the enterprise 
group would become the controlling shareholder of the listed.company. This mode 
reminds us of the issue of "state's representative" discussed earlier in this chapter. As 
a matter of fact, the enterprise groups - often incorporated as state-owned 
corporations or limited liability corporations themselves - are usually authorized to 
“own” the state assets vested with the listed company on behalf of the state. 
The final mode could be described as a "co-sponsor restructuring"�‘‘gongtong 
chongzu'"). Multiple institutions, instead of one major SOE, might get involved in the 
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process of establishing a brand-new company. There might be a variety of co-
sponsors including SOEs, financial institutions, and SAHCs. Although one or two of 
the co-sponsors might hold relatively more ownership interests in the new company, 
they usually do not enjoy the status of an absolutely dominant shareholder as the 
holding company in the above-discussed modes. Co-sponsorship becomes attractive 
for two reasons: business expansion or funding support. The co-sponsors join their 
efforts either because they share some previous business relationships and expect to 
expand the business through a new venture, or because additional funding sources are 
needed to facilitate the restructuring process. It has also been reported that the local 
government played an important role in directing such a reorganization process. The 
link between the new company and its sponsors in terms of personnel, history, or 
culture may not be so strong as in the case of restructuring centered on one SOE. 
Relatively speaking, this mode of restructuring has been less' observed in Chinese 
companies (Shao, 1998). 
In this study, it is argued that the IPO-related asset restructuring• activities 
might be seen as the SOEs' efforts in meeting the legal requirements about multiple 
ownership structure. More important, the number of sponsors, the status of each 
sponsor, and the relationships among multiple sponsors would greatly impact on the 
attributes of the boards of directors in the shareholding companies. The status of 
sponsors is emphasized for an important reason: It can—bring to light many clues to the 
economic, social, and historical contexts once facing the IPO company, which would 
be valuable information for corporate governance research. 
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3„4 Corporate Governance Research in China: Theories and Empirical E.vldence 
One objective of the present study is to apply the Western-developed 
corporate governance theories in the Chinese setting. For this purpose, it would be 
meaningful to review the debates regarding corporate governance among Chinese 
academic researchers. Corporate governance research has obtained increasing 
attention in China. Basically, corporate governance is an imported concept. Aoki and 
Kim (Aoki, Kim, & The World Bank, 1995) first introduced this coneept to Chinese 
economists in the mid-1990，s and claimed that China, like other transition economies, 
was faced with serious "insider control" problem. They suggested that a Japanese-
style, control-oriented banking system might help mitigate the problem of insufficient 
external financing and underdeveloped capital market (Aoki & Kim，1995). Their 
opinion triggered off debates among Chinese researchers about which governance 
model, the Anglo-American model or the Japanese model, would best suit the Chinese 
context. The later reform progress seemed in favor -of the Anglo-American model. 
The corporate governance framework specified in China's Company Law was "not 
dissimilar" to the Anglo-American model, as observed by Tarn (2000). In China, most 
corporate governance work has appeared in economic literature and showed obvious 
linkage with the logic of agency theory (Li, 1999; Wang, 1999; Zheng, 1998). As 
ownership structure came to the center of China's reform package, corporate 
governance scholars (e.g., Qian, 1996; Zhang, 1996) have been enthusiastic in 
proposing the ways to create "real" owners in place of the theoretical owner of all the 
SOEs - the state. Much attention has been directed to the way of identifying or �.. ‘ .. 
creating a capable "principal-owner" within the framework of "socialist market 
economy." Private property rights, which is taken for granted in a capitalist economic 
system, remains a political taboo in China. As to specific internal governance devices, 
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there have been more anecdotal notes than well-grounded empirical studies on how 
the governance systems, if any, really worked in Chinese enterprises. And these 
anecdotal notes are mostly about the "dark side" of the governance structure in old 
SOEs, for example, governmental intervention, insider control, and asset stripping 
(Jia, 1995; Smyth, 2000; Tung, 1996). 
Different theoretical perspectives on corporate governance have been 
proposed to examine the governance issues in China. For example, a number of 
researchers proposed that the most appropriate governance model should take into 
account the stakeholders' interests, especially interests of the employees and the 
banks (Cui, 1996; Yang & Zhou, 1997). These authors based their arguments on the 
fact that China lacks the institutional environment (e.g., well-developed capital 
market and managerial labor market) that has nurtured the Anglo-American 
governance model (Tarn, 1999). In contrast, some researchers emphasized that 
priority should be given to the development of external institutional conditions that 
would facilitate the SOEs' transformation into competitive market players and reduce 
information asymmetry between the principals and the agents (e.g., Lin, Cai, & Li, 
1998). Still, there have been other economists who suggested that two complementary 
incentive mechanisms - residual claim right and residual control power - should be 
considered when designing the governance system (Huang, 2000). Classic agency 
theory suggests that managers' interests could be aligned with shareholders' interests 
if the managers were granted residual claim right in the form of share ownership in 
the company. Huang (2000) proposed that the managers could equally be motivated to 
work for the benefit of the enterprise if they were granted with more control power. 
She argued that managers would have more chances to satisfy their self-actualization .  • * .1 -
needs and sense of responsibility if they were given more control over the corporate 
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affairs. Therefore, control power could be seen as another form of incentive for 
managers. In a similar vein, Zhou (1996) discussed the importance of managerial 
human capital in influencing the construction of a theory of the firm. Some trace of 
similarity to stewardship theory emerges from these authors' arguments. 
However, empirical studies on Chinese corporate governance structure were 
limited in number. Some recent studies are listed in Appendix B. These studies were 
selected from the articles published in two Chinese leading journals in economic and 
management research from 1998 to present. The two journals were Economic 
Research Journal CJingji Yanjiu”) and Management World CGuanli Shijie”）. The 
1998-2000 period was chosen because few empirical ^studies were found before that 
period. Note that many studies offered only descriptions about the status quo of 
corporate governance; few tested theory-based hypotheses. But these studies disclosed 
some very useful information about the current situation in Chinese companies. 
It can be seen from Appendix B that Chinese researchers have paid more 
attention to ownership structure. An overall impression is that the percentage of state 
shares is not associated with good corporate performance - a result that calls for more 
efforts in diluting state ownership. It is easy to understand this surging interest in 
ownership structure in view of China's recent effort in establishing a diversified 
ownership structure for its previously centrally controlled enterprises. The studies on 
Chinese enterprises' internal governance mechanisms have grown in number, but 
many of them did not go beyond general descriptions. The central issues have been 
the impact of ownership structure on board composition and the problems caused by 
insider control. For example, two related studies (Chen, Zhang, & Zhang，2000; He, 
1998) explored the relationships between insider control and such organizational 
factors as state share concentration and firm history. The level of insider control was 
. . . � . . . ‘ 
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higher in those enterprises controlled by the State and with a longer history. However, 
the impact of insider control on firm performance was not formally tested in these 
studies, CEO duality has been studied in terms of its relationship with other 
governance systems such as ownership concentration and insider ratio. Only one 
study tested the effect of board leadership structure on firm performance (Wu, Bai, & 
Xi, 1998) but did not find significant effect. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer necessary background information 
about China's ongoing corporatization reform. The most important reform moves in 
the past two decades are reviewed. These early attempts did lead to improved 
efficiency, however, they were also accompanied by inflating agency problems and 
asset strippings. The problems boiled down to unclear ownership structure of SOEs. 
The corporatization reform was launched with the objective of clarifying the Chinese 
firms' ownership structure and establishing modern corporate governance structure in 
these firms. The multitiered state asset management system thus represented an 
important move toward this direction. Under this system, various SAHCs have been 
created, which represented the state to manage the vast amount of assets utilized by 
SOEs. They are expected to appear as "blood-and-flesh" owners of the enterprises. 
This chapter also describes how the SOEs are restructured as shareholding 
companies. Five modes of asset restructuring are identified based on previous 
researchers，work. In summary, knowledge of the institutional context of China's 
corporatization reform would facilitate researchers' effort in "demystifying" the 
corporate governance systems and dynamics in Chinese firms. 
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CHAPTER 4. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Theoretical Background and Research Questions 
A temporary conclusion might be drawn from the previous literature review� 
Corporate governance (in particular, board of directors) is a promising yet 
controversial research area where different theories and methods are seeking 
"legitimacy." This theoretical and methodological complexity has been observed in 
both Western and Chinese literature. Gioia and Pitre (1990) pointed out, 
"Organizational studies are paradigmatically anchored. A paradigm is a general 
perspective or way of thinking that reflects fundamental beliefs and assumptions 
about the nature of the organizations" (p. 585). When faced with complex 
organizational phenomena, one would be naturally curious about one thing: Which 
theory can better explain them? Given the complexity of organizational phenomena, 
a reasonable argument is that each theory could be relevant under specific 
circumstances. It is always intellectually interesting and challenging to examine 
different theories simultaneously in an appropriate setting, i.e., a setting that offers 
equal potential for both theories to display their explanatory power. And perhaps it is 
more important to identify the contextual factors that determine the degree to which 
one theory has more explanatory power than the other. 
China is suggested to be an appropriate research setting for us to explore the 
above possibilities. Chinese enterprises, which have been experiencing profound 
changes, provide for researchers a desirable scene that is full ^f possibilities. On the 
one hand, it is possible and necessary to apply agency theory to examine Chinese 
firms' governance effectiveness because the governance reform, as discussed earlier, 
has been largely guided by the logic of agency theory. On the other hand, stewardship 
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theory, on its appearance, coincides with many generally recognized characteristics of 
the Chinese context in terms of collectivist culture, cooperation, interpersonal 
relationship, and so on. Thus it is appealing to apply this theory to the governance 
dynamics within Chinese organizations, too. This study is intended to examine board 
composition and leadership structure in the Chinese context within the framework of 
agency theory and stewardship theory. Undeniably, there are a variety of alternative 
theories in the field of corporate governance. However, attention goes to agency 
theory and stewardship theory because of their interesting contrasts and potential 
complementarity. 
Table 1. A Comparison of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory 
Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Focus Principal-agent relationship Principal-steward relationship 
Objective Minimum agency cost Maximum cooperation benefit 
Human Behavior • Bounded rationality • Pro-organizational 
Assumption . Self-interest seeking • Collectivist 
• Opportunistic • Trustworthy 
Organizational • Goal conflict • Goal alignment 
context • Information asymmetry • Information sharing 
Governance • Pecuniary contract (Bonding) • Psychological contract 
Device • Behavioral control (intrinsic motivation) 
• Institutional power • Enabling structure 
• Structural arrangement • Informal power 
• Interpersonal relationship 
(social capital) 
1— • • 丨丨, ； 丨 .•• -丨   Board Members' • Extrinsic motivators (e.g., • Extrinsic motivators ("survival 
Incentive ownership interest, c^ needs") , �� \ : / \S� � � \ professional reputation) • Intrinsic motivators (e.g., 
� > > � � �\  \. •、 ； ‘ “ “ \ \ … 一 … 产 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , collective , , 
、\、 、、 、、、、 s • • • •  •” • 
\ \ \ \ • 
� y > � \� goals) 
Table 1 presents a comparison of agency theory and stewardship theory along 
a number of important dimensions. Agency theory and stewardship theory contradicts 
with each other in their theoretical focuses and objectives, assumptions about human 
nature and organizational contexts, and predictions about effective governance 
devices�On the agency theory side, the key concept is board independence. In this 
sense the board of directors is essentially interpreted as a monitoring or control 
mechanism. Control becomes necessary because managers are untrustworthy. The 
board has two not-mutually exclusive options to achieve effective monitoring. One is 
to "bind" the managers to the organization by means of pecuniary contract 
(managerial compensation plans) and the other is to directly oversee and control 
managers' behavior. Agency theory emphasizes the directors' institutional power --
authority granted to the directors by the Company Law - and the -structural 
arrangements that enhance board independence (e.g., increasing the outsider 
representation on the boards). Briefly, agency theory suggests that a capable board 
should be an independent board. In contrast, the ideal board of directors in 
stewardship theory literature is best to be described as a cooperative board. A 
cooperative board would empower rather than control the top managers, because 
managers are pro-organizational stewards and would do a better job to improve firm 
performance if given sufficient autonomy. An implication is that the board members 
are capable of bringing out the "best side” of the managers and are ‘ active in 
communicating with the managers. In other words, stewardship theory implies that 
cooperation between the board and the managers could benefit the organization only 
when there is an enabling environment characterized by close interpersonal 
relationship, trust, and communication. Cooperation without an enabling environment 
is not a logical reasoning from stewardship theory. In one word, stewardship theory 
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emphasizes that board control should be achieved by establishing a psychological 
contract between the board and the management�An effective board is able to make 
the best use of informal power that is embedded in interpersonal relationships. To put 
it in another way, stewardship theory proposes that a capable board should be a 
cooperative board. 
Interestingly, in spite of the above-discussed contradictions, the two theories 
seem to converge at the directors' incentives to act in the interests of the shareholders. 
Both theories recognize that the directors may be motivated by extrinsic reward (e.g., 
director share ownership) to performance their role. Agency theory explains this in 
terms of a rational economic man's action to maximize his/her utility (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Stewardship theory, in fact, also views the extrinsic reward as one 
component of the steward's utility function. But this theory argues that a steward's 
opportunity set is "constrained by the perception that the utility gained from pro-
organizational behavior is higher than the utility that can be gained" through 
individualistic, self-serving behavior，，(Davis et al., 1997: 25). Therefore, stewardship 
theory extends its arguments about incentive mechanisms beyond extrinsic rewards. 
But it is still worth attention that the two theories partially overlap with respect to the 
incentive mechanisms. This may have significant implications for the design of board 
and executive incentive plans. 
In China, some efforts have been taken to diversify a portion of the state 
ownership into private hands. The director ownership scheme has been introduced in 
shareholding companies on an experimental basis. But presently its incentive effect 
remains dubious due to the underdeveloped stock market and volatile stock 
performance. Currently, incentive and capability of different types of directors in the 
Chinese context are suggested to be more closely related to the historical linkages 
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between the directors and the corporation. By studying board composition we may 
reveal such linkages and further explore the implications of board composition on 
board effectiveness� 
In brief, the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between board 
composition / leadership structure and organizational performance in . Chinese 
shareholding companies. Two specific questions will be investigated in this study. 
1. What characteristics do Chinese shareholding companies possess in terms of 
board composition and leadership structure? 
2. Which theory 一 agency or stewardship 一 would have greater predictive power 
regarding the relationship between board composition / leadership structure and 
organizational performance? 
4.2 A New Approach to Understanding Board Composition in China . . . . . . ‘ 
In this study, a new scheme was developed to measure board composition in 
Chinese firms. The purpose of this context-specific classification scheme is to match 
theory and reality by differentiating the "institutional backgrounds" of different types 
of directors. The behavioral differences among the directors can be largely attributed 
to their different institutional backgrounds. 
Under this scheme, the directors in a typical Chinese shareholding company 
are classified into three categories. Inside directors include current employees of the 
focal firm and its wholly owned subsidiaries (quanzi zigongsi). Affiliated directors •• ‘ 
specifically refer to the directors who represent the single or leading sponsor 
enterprise of the focal firm. (Note: In the following discussion the term "founding 
SOE" is sometimes used as an interchangeable term for "sponsor.") More important, 
this sponsor is a business entity itself and in the mean time has historical relationship 
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with the focal firm„ The definition of affiliated directors has to do with the asset 
restructuring modes discussed in Chapter 3. Generally speaking, if the directors come 
from the founding SOE in the third mode or the enterprise group in the fourth mode, 
they are qualified as affiliated directors according to this definition. Two things are 
important for understanding this class of directors. First, they are representatives of 
the founding enterprise that is an industrial/commercial business entity but not a pure 
financing company (like a pure SAHC). Second, such-an enterprise continues to exist 
» ; 
as an independent business entity rather than being merged into the shareholding 
company. It is expected that many Chinese firms have affiliated directors on their 
boards. There was report that about 900 out of all the 949 listed companies (by the 
end of 1999) had been transformed from old SOEs and had went through asset 
restructuring process before going public (Chen et al.，2000). A simple way to define 
independent directors is that all the directors who are not insider or affiliated directors 
would fall into this category. Specifically, they may include directors from 
government agencies, special-purpose SAHCs, trust and investment companies 
* 
{xintuo touzi gongsi), insurance companies, securities companies, public legal person 
shareholders who purchase their shares on the secondary market (shehui faren 
gudong), academics, other independent professionals, and outside individual 
shareholders. Generally speaking, individual shareholders have been underrepresented 
on the boards of Chinese firms and have little influence on corporate governance (Xu 
& Wang，1999). In this study, special weight is given to the firm's founding enterprise 
because k is believed the linkage between the founding enterprise and the focal firm 
would produce much deeper influence on the firm's activities.than would the other 
general trading partners. In this sense, it is one particular form of affiliation 
relationships 一 the relationship between the sponsor and the focal firm 一 that is 
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stressed in the definition of affiliated directors. It is- more likely that the affiliated 
directors constitute a social group with special background and behavioral pattern that 
are worth scrutiny under the lenses of both agency theory and stewardship theory. 
Many previous researchers have questioned the conventional two-way 
classification scheme of "inside" (corporate employee) or "outside" (non-employee) 
directors (e.g., Baysinger & Butler，1985; Byrd & Hickman，1992; Kosnik, 1987; 
Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Following the logic of agency 
theory, some researchers suggested that the dichotomy of board membership fails to 
consider particular conflicts of interest when directors' are not full-time employees of 
the focal company but have affiliations with the company (Byrd & Hickman, 1992). 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) proposed a three-way classification to replace the two-
way classification. They distinguished three types of directors: inside directors, 
independent outside directors, and affiliated outside directors. The key is to 
distinguish between two subgroups of outside directors. Independent directors have 
no affiliation with the firm other than their directorship (e.g., private investors, 
business executives, academics, and decision makers from the public sectors). 
Affiliated directors are not flill-time employees of the firm but associated with it in 
some way (e.g., investment bankers, commercial banks that have made loans to the 
firm, lawyers providing services to the firm, consultants, officers and directors of the 
firm's suppliers and customers, interlocking directors) (Baysinger & Butler，1985). 
This operationalization has been used by many researchers (Bamhart et al., 1994; 
Byrd & Hickman，1992; Finkelstein & D'Aveni，1994; Johnson et al., 1996; 




The present study used the same labels as those used by Baysinger and Butler 
(1985) in the classification scheme because these labels suit the descriptive purpose 
well. However, the scope of affiliation is not extended as far-reaching as the above 
authors suggested because Chinese firms are still on their way to a diversified 
ownership structure and board composition. At this stage most firms are characterized 
by a relatively concentrated ownership structure in which "owners" have to be named 
from a group of institutions, affiliated with one another in this way or other. In this 
institutional context, it is the degree of affiliation rather than the presence of 
affiliation that offers a better calibration for differentiating the board members. 
There is a further note about this classification scheme. The asset restructuring 
modes are recognized to have impact on the characteristics of board composition. 
However, it seems that the asset restructuring mode and board affiliation are not 
necessarily interchangeable operationalizations because there has been evidence that 
board membership is not proportional to the ownership structure (Xu & Wang, 1999). 
The ownership structure may influence board composition in Chinese firms, but not 
totally determine the patterns of board composition. That is why I hope to contribute 
to the knowledge about Chinese firms' corporate governance by specifically focusing 
on the board attributes. 
An analytical framework is provided in Table 2 as a basis for developing the 
hypotheses of this study. The purpose is to find a common ground, on which 
competing hypotheses could be built with “blocks，，from agency theory and 
stewardship theory respectively. As can be seen in Table 2, the left column indicates 
the two board attributes - composition and leadership structure - along with their 
elements. The two right-handed columns contain two sets of arguments derived from 
agency theory and stewardship theory. For the sake of clarity, the following 
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arguments will be revolved around a range of process factors that both theories regard 
as logical consequences of board structure and important for board effectiveness. 
These key process factors include the directors' incentive, knowledge / ability, ties 
witfi the managers, and use of power. Conflicting predictions are made in terms of 
these factors. This list is by no means comprehensive and exhaustive, but these factors 
can be seen as a common thread that links agency theory and stewardship theory and 
then puts them in striking contrast. 
4.3 Board Composition and Firm Performance 
This persistent interest in board composition is attributed to the belief that 
board composition may affect directors' ability to influence organizational 
performance (Pearce & Zahra，1992). The following theoretical arguments are 
centered on two subgroups of outside directors: affiliated directors and independent 
directors. For several reasons no hypotheses are made about inside directors. First, the 
previous board studies have been particularly interested in the effect of outsider 
representation. Agency theory has played an important role in shaping this research 
tradition with its emphasis on board independence. Second, the Chinese authority set 
outsider representation as one important reform goal. Interestingly, studies on outside 
directors have been somehow overlooked in the Chinese academic literature. More 
studies took interest in insider control, but the present study takes more interest in 
ej^amining the outside directors' influence on performance of Chinese firms, which is 
thought to have more implications given the current reform trend. 
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Table 2. An Analytical Framework about Board of Directors 
Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Board Composition 
• High incentive to monitor CEO • High incentive to cooperate, but 
• Capability in monitoring CEO perhaps not so high as that of 
• Wide scope of advice / councel affiliated directors 
Independent directors • Objectivity resulting from lack of • Capability based on a wide scope 
ties with managers of complementary knowledge 
• Psychological distance resulting 
from lack of ties with managers 
• Low incentive to monitor CEO • High incentive to cooperate with 
• Lack of capability in monitoring CEO 
CEO • Capability based on firm-specific, 
Affiliated directors • Narrow-focused knowledge unique knowledge 
• Moral hazard resulting from close • Pro-organizational, collective 
ties with managers interests resulting from close ties 
with managers 
• Less likely to be dominated by • Communication barrier 
Large board size the CEO • Weak group cohesiveness 
• Variety of expertise / resources • Less cooperation 
Board Leadership Structure 
• Power balance • Loss of unified leadership 
CEO duality (Single • Controlled CEO (Avoid CEO • Discouraged CEO 
leadership structure) entrenchment) • Weakened cooperation 
• Board independence / impartiality 
• Power abuse • Unitary command 
• "Out-of-control" CEO • Empowered CEO 
CEO non-duality • Board - "CEO's doll" • Internal efficiencies through 
(Combined leadership) strong leadership 
• Board — "CEO's good consultant" 
More important, as will be discussed below, the two board composition 
measures - the proportion of independent directors and the proportion of affiliated 
directors - might be proxy for two alternative governance mechanisms favored by 
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agency theory and stewardship theory respectively. Neither of the two composition 
measures is able to flilly capture concerns of both theories. In other words, the 
propositions of agency theory may be better realized through increasing independent 
director representation, while the ideas of stewardship theory should be conveyed 
through affiliated director representation. 
For the purpose of theoretical comparison, it is crucial to use appropriate 
measure for the concepts from different theories. Not surprisingly, agency theory and 
stewardship theory both have their own judgment about "the other" way to board 
design. The "pros and cons" from the point of view of each theory will be presented 
in the next section. 
4.3.1 Agency Theory Hypotheses 
Independent Directors and Firm Performance 
According to agency theory, the most important function of the board of 
directors is to protect shareholders' interests and scrutinize the top managers within 
the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980). This role requires of boar4 independence. 
The standard agency view is that the degree of board independence is closely related 
to its composition (John & Senbet，1998). Outside directors are assumed to be more 
motivated to monitor the management because they have incentives to develop 
reputation in decision control (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Fama (1980) suggested that the 
outside directors might best be regarded as "professional referees，，whose task is to 
stimulate and oversee the competition among the top managers. In a well-developed 
market system, these outside directors would be in turn disciplined by the labor 
market for their services as referees. The pricing mechanism 6f this directorial labor 
market would stimulate the outside directors' incentive to monitor the top managers. 
» 
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Also implicit in this line of argument is that the outside directors would treasure their 
reputation as "professional referees." Viewing the -Chinese independent directors 
* _ 
under this lens, it might be true that these new "corporate elite" have incentive to 
perform their legitimate duty diligently out of a desire for good reputation ~ or put in 
a subtler Chinese term - hope for not losing one's "face" as a high-profile 
independent director. Tarn ( 1999) conducted a survey in 58 Chinese listed companies 
in 1993, he reported that 54 percent of all surveyed directors took "representing and 
serving the interests of all shareholders" as their fundamental role (p. 70)，while 85 
percent of the directors thought of the most desirable attribute of directors as "strong 
sense of responsibility and participation in company”—(p. 71). It seems that given an 
obviously under-developed labor market, the concern for responsibility and reputation 
might be still at work among Chinese directors. Agency theory also suggests that the 
» 
most needed capability of the board of directors is the capability in decision control 
(Rediker & Seth，1995). Outside directors are suggested to be in a better position than 
inside directors in evaluating managerial decisions with a critical eye and 
guaranteeing that these decisions are in alignment with shareholders' interests, given 
that these directors are truly independent from the managers (Mallette & Fowler, 
1992). As the strategic role of the board began to attract public attention, agency 
theorists suggest that outside directors would be able to provide a wide range of 
advice to the management (Zahra & Pearce，1989). Finally, objectivity of independent 
directors is emphasized in agency theory. Outside directors are presumed to have the 
skills to assess accurately the performance of the firm's management (Kosnik, 1987). 
An insider-dominant board is more likely to collude with the managers and 
expropriate shareholders' wealth. However, the probability of such collusive 
arrangements might be lowered and board effectiveness enhanced if outside directors 
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dominate the board (Fama, 1980). According to this line of thinking, the proportion of 
independent directors on the board should be positively related to firm performance. 
This might be the case in China, too. Although it is possible that some of the 
independent directors on a firm's board represent firms that maintain some degree of 
5 
relationship with the focal firm, it is clear that the ties between the focal firm's 
managers and the affiliated directors are much stronger than those with independent 
directors. In other words, independent directors in Chinese firms might be in a more 
objective position due to their weaker ties with the firms' management. 
In summary, the agency view of independent directors suggests that these 
directors may be more active in monitoring the managers out of their concern for 
professional reputation, have ability to offer a wide scope of advice, and be less 
inclined to collude with the management. Therefore, agency theory leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis la (agency theory): The proportion of independent directors is 
positively related to performance of a Chinese shareholding company. 
Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance 
The agency logic would naturally drive at a conclusion that affiliated directors 
are not independent. Slightly different from inside directors who are assumed to lack 
independence because they are directly subordinate to the CEO in the corporate 
hierarchy (Frankforter et al., 2000), affiliated directors lack independence because 
they have economic relationships with the focal firm. As mentioned above, a founding 
enterprise of a Chinese shareholding company ~ whether it is a single SOE in the 
third mode of asset restructuring or a large enterprise group in the fourth mode ~ 
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often signs service contracts with the shareholding company. These contracts cover a 
variety of matters ranging from land-use rights, lease of plant / equipment, to logistic 
services (Aharony et al., 2000; Shao, 2000). Such a phenomenon could be seen as the 
firm's response to the under-developed factor market and slow reform progress in the 
social security system. It is beyond the scope of this study to explore various 
incentives behind the asset restructuring modes. But one a|-gument is that such 
practices (e.g., separating productive and non-productive assets and hence 
transforming a SOE from a "small society" to two or more independent business 
entities specialized in manufacturing and service respectively) conform to the 
efficiency rationale. Such a transformation process is largely a rational response to the 
institutional constraints. However, the impact of such practices on the firm's 
governance structure is perhaps ambiguous and can be explained from different 
perspectives. Under the lens of agency theory, the presence of more affiliated 
directors on the firm's board signals the possibility of collusion .because these 
directors, in most cases, have close social ties with the managers of the shareholding 
company. Consequently, they would be less objective and less willing to challenge the 
managers' decisions. However, note that there is a special issue in the Chinese context 
that may render the agency logic to another paradox. That is, affiliated directors as 
defined in this study represent the largest shareholder in many cases. Agency theory 
suggests that a large shareholder would be more active in monitoring top managers 
(Hill & Snell，1989). All these complexities - la^e share ownership, • business 
relations with the shareholding company (which is usually not the case' with the large 
institutional shareholders in the US), and directorial link - make it somehow hard to 
come up with a straightforward prediction about the affiliated directors' influence. 
Overall, agency theory seems to arrive at a negative evaluation of the affiliated 
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directors' influence. For one thing, the positive monitoring role of a large shareholder 
may not be linked to the affiliated directors because these directors do not always 
represent the largest shareholder. In many cases, it is the SAHC instead of the 
founding SOE that holds the position of the largest shareholder despite the fact that 
the firm's board is dominated by affiliated directors‘ This observation weakens the 
large shareholder argument. For the other, considering agency theory's topmost 
concern - board independence, it is a logical inference that a board dominated by 
affiliated directors would not perform its role properly. Therefore, agency theory 
would propose the following hypothesis about affiliated directors: 
Hypothesis 2a (agency theory): The proportion of affiliated directors is 
negatively related to performance of a Chinese shareholding company. 
Board Size and Firm Performance 
Compared with outsider representation, board size seems to be a less 
researched aspect of board structure in agency theory literature (Yermack, 1996). 
Opinions about the size effect vary among the agency theory writers. For example, 
Jensen (1993) noted that the boards would reach a level-off performance when the 
number of boards exceeds seven or eight. However, given the standard agency view 
that the board of directors be an effective information system and independent 
monitoring mechanism (Eisenhardt, 1989)，larger boards would be preferred over 
smaller boards. In fact, Eisenhardt (1989) indicated that the richness of board 
information could be related to a range of board characteristics including number of 
subcommittees, number of board members with long tenure, number of board 
members with management and industry experience, and number of board members 
61 
representing specific ownership groups. Obviously, a larger board would be a more 
effective mechanism that makes it possible for all these characteristics to be 
embedded. Moreover, it has been suggested that larger boards might enhance 
corporate governance by reducing CEO domination (Muth & Donaldson，1998). 
Dealing with a large board, the CEO may find it difficult to exercise his/her personal 
influence�It would be a tougher task for the CEO to persuade a sufficient proportion 
of directors into his/her actions that may be in conflicrwith the shareholders’ interests 
s 
(Singh & Harianto, 1989). Finally, other things being equal, as the board size 
increases, there is a higher possibility that more outside directors would join the 
board. For Chinese firms, increasing board size might be the most cost-efficient way 
to increase outsider representation and hence board independence. Taken together, 
agency theory would come to the following hypothesis regarding the board size 
effect: 
Hypothesis 3a (agency theory): Board size is positively related to 
performance of a Chinese shareholding company. 
4.3.2 Stewardship Theory Hypotheses 
Independent Directors and Firm Performance 
Stewardship theory emphasizes the board's cooperation with the TMT rather 
than its independence from the TMT. As far as the directors' incentive is concerned, 
stewardship theory assumes that the board members are stewards for the shareholders. 
» 
In this sense, all types of directors theoretically have incentive to be stewards. 
However, careful examination of typical independent directors on a Chinese firm's 
board may lead to a conclusion that these directors' capability in cooperating with the 
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management is generally limited and questionable. This, according to stewardship 
* _ 
theory, would reduce the effectiveness of the board. 
As mentioned earlier, independent directors include those from government 
agencies, SAHCs, financial institutions, and other enterprises / institutions. It was as 
late in 1997 that the government officials were prohibited from holding corporate 
board positions (Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistical Annual, 1997). A special case 
with Chinese companies is that the state or its agents carry out shareholder functions 
otherwise performed by private owners in market economies (The World Bank, 
1997). Numerous studies have noted these state representatives' incapability in 
performing the shareholder's role (Broadman, 1999; Chen, 1997; Gray, 1996). The 
SAHC-appointed directors, similarly, lack the necessary capability for several 
reasons. For one thing, many SAHCs are almost identical with previous industrial 
bureaus in terms of organizational structure, line of authority, and personnel. It has 
been reported that the SAHC-appointed directors were not significantly different from 
government officials in the way they dealt with the firm. For the other, even if these 
directors were motivated to protect the state's interests, their ability is questionable 
due to the fact that they are responsible for overseeing a large amount of assets 
dispersed in various enterprises. If they were appointed to sit on several boards, they 
are unlikely to fully understand the operation of particular firms and can hardly have 
chances to develop good teamwork with other directors and the managers in any 
particular firm. The case may be the same with the directors who represent banks and 
other financial institutions. The reform progress in China's banking sector has been 
slower than in its industrial sector (Saving, 1998). The banks are managed somewhat 
as an extension of the government. They still have a long way to go in establishing 
their own independence. It is unrealistic to expect, under such circumstances, that the 
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directors from state-controlled banks possess sufficient knowledge to help run a non-
fmancial shareholding firm. As for the independent directors representing other 
minority legal person shareholders, it is suspected that they also lack motivation to 
understand the organizational processes. Generally speaking, independent directors 
enjoy fewer informational advantages than affiliated directors do. They have only 
limited contact with the day-to-day decision-making process of the firm. Also, their 
communication with the management is more likely to take place only at a limited 
number of board meetings. The independent directors and the managers usually do 
not share work experience, operational knowledge base, and interpersonal trust. All 
these could lead to a situation in which both the management and the independent 
directors hold a "us-them" stance and find hard to treat the other party as in-group 
members (Tsui & Gutek，1999). It is difficult for these "newcomer" directors to 
develop mutual trust with the corporate management. Consequently, - effective 
communication and active involvement in strategic decision making may be devoid 
between independent directors and managers. The independent directors at best 
possess only nominal authority over the shareholding company. Stewardship theory, 
therefore, predicts that organizational performance will be at stake if the organization 
has a greater proportion of independent directors on its board. These arguments thus 
lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Is (stewardship theory): The proportion of independent 
directors is negatively related to performance of a Chinese shareholding 
company. 
64 
Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance 
Stewardship theory uses a ruler different from the one used by agency theory 
to measure the affiliated directors' role and influence in Chinese companies. One the 
一 • 
whole, affiliated directors are expected to be more motivated, and more capable to 
create a trust-based work relationship with the CEO and other top managers and in 
turn, to direct the TMT's efforts toward improving organizational performance. And it 
is the close social ties between the affiliated directors and the managers that lay at the 
foundation of an interactive, constructive board-TMT relationship. 
First, affiliated directors are assumed to be highly motivated to perform their 
duty. In practice, affiliated directors on a firm's board, as a special group, may be 
more prone to stewardship behavior because of their collective interest. Stewardship 
theorists suggest that collectivist culture could be a facilitative situational factor 
underpinning principal-stewardship relationships (Davis et al., 1997). In this study, it 
is argued that a collectivist group culture is a product of both the cultural values at the 
societal level and the history of the group in question. China is generally recognized 
as a collectivist culture (Hofstede, 1980). However, the current analysis is focused on 
the group culture rather than the national culture. Take a typical Chinese board 
composing of both affiliated directors and independent directors as an example. The 
presumption that the bonds (historical, economic, and emotional) among affiliated 
. . . . . . . ‘ 
directors are stronger than those among independent directors should not be too far 
from reality. The affiliated directors are bound together by common work experience 
in the founding SOE and shared group norms and values. So it is more likely to 
observe collective goals among affiliated directors, which should be consistent with 
those of the firm. Since stewardship theory suggests that the parties involved in a 
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principal-steward relationship are pro-organizational, it is expected that the affiliated 
directors' goals also be proorganizational, i.e.，improving the overall performance of 
the firm. 
In contrast, independent directors usually do not enjoy a high level of cultural 
coherence among themselves. They may represent different institutions to sit on the 
board, barely knowing each other outside the boardroom. Even in the extreme case 
that all independent directors come from a single institution, which is hardly true, and 
have established their own group collectivity, their status as "outsiders of the firm" 
may hinder them from developing "synergy" with the affiliated directors and the top 
managers of the shareholding company. The importance of this "synergy" between 
directors and top managers will be discussed later in more detail. For now, even given 
the overall assumption about stewardship behavior on the part of the directors, it 
seems that the directors' performance would differ according to their own resources 
as a capable group to cooperate with the top managers. The group of affiliated 
directors is expected to do a better job in this regard. ‘ 
When it comes to the fundamental role of the board of directors, stewardship 
theory stresses "involvement rather than control, trust rather than monitoring, and 
performance enhancement rather than cost-control" (Burton, 2000:198). The directors 
fulfill their duties and improve organizational effectiveness not by means of 
controlling, but by means of participating in the firm's strategic decision-making, 
providing advice to the firm management, and seeking access to critical resources 
needed by the firm. Note that stewardship theory does not abandon the "control" 
concept; rather, it prefers "control by managers" over "control by the board" (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). On the part of the board, it is expected to support the management 
and offer valuable counsel and service to the management (Block, 1993). The biggest 
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difference between stewardship theory and agency theory is that the former advocates 
insider-dominated boards because the insiders can provide in-depth knowledge, 
access to current operating information, technical expertise and commitment to the 
firm (Donaldson, 1990; Muth & Donaldson，1998). In this study, it is suggested that 
affiliated directors can equal to inside directors in their capabilities and knowledge 
depth. Although China's Company Law prohibits the founding SOE or the enterprise 
group, as the parent of a shareholding company, from operating the same businesses 
as the shareholding company, it is reasonable to predict that the affiliated directors 
know very well about the shareholding company's business due' to the historical links 
between the two firms. The affiliated directors have advantage over independent 
directors in terms of their firm-specific expertise. In other words, the affiliated 
directors can better identify the main problems facing the firm and more skilled at 
solving those problems. Affiliated directors may also have relatively greater access to 
subjective information about top managers' performance. Because they and the CEO 
often interact in ways that are relevant to assessing the quality of the decision-making 
process, relations between these parties are more —likely to be open as. well as 
subjective (Baysinger & Hoskisson，1990). Moreover, as the representatives of the 
sponsor enterprise, the affiliated directors are able to secure critical external resources 
for the shareholding company. These resources include ties with governmental 
agencies, "policy benefits" (zhengce youhui) that have been enjoyed by the sponsor, 
and even important business partnerships (Shao, 2000). In this sense, affiliated 
directors serve the firm not only as experienced experts but also as resource liaisons. 
Independent directors could be good at securing access to external resources 
according to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 8c Salancik, 1978); however, as ‘ ‘ 
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mentioned above, their performance in this resource role might be weakened by the 
lack of collective goal and effort. _ 
Finally, the close social ties between the affiliated directors and the managers 
can be seen as another source of the affiliated directors' advantage over independent 
directors. It is argued here that a synergy (or valuable social capital) between the 
affiliated directors and the managers takes shape out of these ties. Basically agency 
theory does not consider the social processes and moral dimensions within the top 
decision teams when it theorizes on the optimal principal-agent contract (Huse, 1994). 
In the positivist agency theory literature, outside directors with personal or 
professional relationships with the firm or its management are usually regarded as less 
effective in fulfilling the control role (Johnson et al.，1996). However, the sociology 
and organization literature has a long tradition in studying the "social embeddedness" 
of economic activities (Granovetter, 1985). The argument of embeddedness indicates 
that "the behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social 
relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding" 
(Granovetter, 1985: 482). This argument has been responded in the rich literature 
about social ties (Davis & Greve, 1997; Geletkanycz & Hambrick，1997; Westphal, 
1999; Westphal & Milton，2000) or social capital (Granovetter, 1973; Leana & Buren, 
1999; Leenders & Gabbay，1999). These streams of research share with stewardship 
theory a common focus on the social relationship among the board and TMT 
members. 
Leana and Buren (1999) defined social capital as "an asset that inheres in 
social relations and networks" (p. 538). Social capital can be analyzed at various 
levels, from individual to nation. It is noted that the theory of organizational social 
capital (Leana & Buren，1999), in spite of its complexity, has something in common 
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with stewardship theory, which helps explain the relationship between affiliated 
directors and managers. As social capital is a valuable asset, a firm embedded with 
abundant social capital will have better performance. The social capital theory 
emphasizes that the primary components of social capital are associability and trust. 
Both elements are necessary for organizational social capital to exist (Leana & Buren, 
1999). This view obviously is in line with the stewardship theory suggestions. 
Meanwhile, it is suggested that the existence of organizational social capital be 
accompanied by such phenomena as shared identity and collective action. This line of 
thinking suggests that the affiliated director - management relationship, compared 
with the independent director - management relationship, should be typically 
embedded with social capital useful to the firm in terms of both quality and quantity. 
Davis et al. (1997) suggested that a longer history of the parties in a principal-steward 
relationship dealing with each other would provide more data to guide the 
expectations that one party holds for the other. Clearly, the role of a long-term 
» 
relationship is central to the choice of stewardship roles. It is reasonable to believe 
that the affiliated director- manager relationship is closer to a principal-steward 
relationship because in most cases the affiliated directors and the management had 
worked together over a long term even before the shareholding company was 
established. This unique long-term interpersonal relationship is necessary for them to 
— • . 
develop interpersonal trust and interdependence (Barkema, 1995; Huse, 1994). 
In the Chinese context, personal relationship and common work experience 
are especially important factors that influence interpersonal dynamics (Tsui & Farh, 
1997). In a sense economic transactions in China may be governed more by social 
relationships rather than by formal contracts (Tain, 1999). Very likely, the common 
work experience of the affiliated directors and the top managers would help them get 
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familiar with each other, establish a comfortable and informative communication 
pattern, and reach an in-depth understanding of the organization's external and 
internal strengths / weaknesses. The two parties may develop a social 
interdependence with each other rather than independence from each other. This 
interdependence may not be dysfunctional if the directors would actively get involved 
in strategic decision-making and the managers woulcT listen to the directors' advice 
» 
and counsel. Another result of such social interactions is that the affiliated directors 
would be more aware of the decision problems and the managers' decision making 
style (Judge & Dobbins, 1995; Neilsen & Rao，1987). The awareness of managers' 
decision style is a premise for the affiliated directors to effectively participate in the 
organizational decision process. Moreover, close social ties between the board and the 
management would encourage the directors to more actively get involved in 
networking activities (Borch & Huse，1993) in order to enlarge the firm's external 
resource base. In short, the institutional origin of the affiliated director - management 
relationship implies rich social capital that helps to improve organizational 
performance. Certainly the independent director - management relationship could 
also be characterized by various forms of social capital. However, what is embedded 
in the relationship between the affiliated directors and the managers is unique in 
nature. 
To sum up, stewardship theory proposes that an effective board should 
maintain close ties with the CEO, and that a trust-based relationship between the 
directors and the CEO would have positive effect on performance (Daft & Weick， 
1984). There should be a positive relationship between the affiliated director 
representation on the board and the firm's performance. Then, stewardship theory 
would have the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2s (stewardship theory): The proportion of affiliated directors is 
positively related to performance of a Chinese shareholding company. 
Board Size and Firm Performance 
Stewardship theory predicts the effects of board size in a way quite different 
from agency theory because of its deep root in sociological and psychological 
theories. Basically, stewardship theory draws upon group, dynamics literature to \ • * • 
explain how the size of a board would influence its process and effectiveness (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). Davis et al. (1997) offered a detailed discussion regarding the 
psychological factors that distinguish stewardship theory from agency theory. They 
emphasized the steward's needs for self-actualization, respect, and sense of 
responsibility. They also explained how a social comparison process (Festinger, 1954) 
would take place between the steward and the principal in which both parties t r e a t s � 
the other as a part of the collective and both would be accountable to the collective. 
Moreover, stewardship theory predicts that a steward would .develop identification 
with the organization and be more readily engaged in citizenship behavior. In the 
principal-steward relationship, the parties involved tend to rely on personal power 
rather than formal power to influence one another. Expert and referent power are 
characterized as personal power. It is suggested that personal power can be sustained 
over longer periods of time. 
Group dynamics literature has demonstrated that it is within a smaller group 
that all the above-mentioned group processes could work to their maximum positive 
effect. For example, group cohesiveness is more likely to develop in- a small group 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Shaw, 1981). And small group size 
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would facilitate the process to reach consensus on important decisions (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). Interpersonal communication and cooperation would be more 
effective in smaller groups (D'Aveni & MacMillan，1990; O'Reilly, Caldwell, & 
Bamett, 1989). The important feature of principal-steward relationship - group 
identification and commitment - is more likely to be nurtured between a smaller 
board and the CEO. According to the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982), members 
of a large group are prone to form factions and develop a mistrust /discrimination 
against out-group members. Similarly, in small boards all members have chances to 
participate in the decision-making process, while in large boards it may be a few 
members who dominate the discussion (Moreland & Levine，1994). As.to the Chinese 
boards, there is a particular benefit from small board size. To put it differently, the 
“social loafing" problem is expected to be not so serious in a small board as in a large 
one (Earley, 1989; Robbins, 1998). Overall, stewardship theory argues that a smaller 
board can contribute to organizational outcomes with its enhanced participation, 
cohesiveness, cooperation, in-depth discussion, and ability to initiate strategic actions. 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3s (stewardship theory): Board size is negatively related to 
performance of a Chinese shareholding company. 
4.4 Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance 
4.4.1 Agency Theory Hypothesis 
Interest in the CEO duality issue has emerged mainly because board 
leadership structure is assumed to have significant implications for corporate 
governance and organizational performance (Baliga et al., 1996). Agency theory has 
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been the main driving force behind this stream of research. Public scrutiny of the 
CEO duality issue reached its peak when several committees, which were active for 
promoting the board reform, recommended the large corporations to adopt a separate 
leadership structure (e.g., Cadbury Committee, 1992). However, academic studies on 
CEO duality-performance relationship have reported mixed findings (Baliga et al., 
1996; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). There has been extensive theoretical debate over the 
effect of CEO duality on corporate performance. 
The board reform activists，major concern is that the structure of CEO duality 
erodes the corporate system of checks and balances and compromises independence 
between the board and the managers (Daily & Dalton，1997). Again, this follows the 
agency logic. Agency theory suggests that CEO duality would reduce the board's 
effectiveness in carrying out its monitoring role (Lorsch & Maclver，1989) and put the 
board in a less powerful position relative to that of the CEO (Daily & Schwenk， 
1996). Where the CEO is also the chairperson of the board, it is unlikely to expect 
that the board hold impartial opinion regarding the CEO's behavior (Donaldson & 
Davis，1991). In the eyes of agency theorists, CEO duality structure systematically 
reduces the board's ability to fulfill its governance function and constitute a clear 
conflict of interest (Dayton, 1984; Rechner & Dalton，1991; Sridharan & John, 1998; 
Vance，1983). When the CEO also chairs the board, there would be more chances that 
the board is misled by the CEO's entrenchment practices (Walsh & Seward，1990). 
Moreover, Chairman-CEOs might use their influence to resist changes, which are 
beneficial for the firm, for fear of damaging their own power base (Daily •& Dalton, 
1994). Therefore, it is proposed that the separation of CEO and board chairman 
position would help improve firm performance. The phenomenon of CEO duality is 
common in Chinese shareholding companies (Zhang, 1999). Following an agency 
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theory diagnosis, the Chinese policy makers and academic researchers generally see 
CEO duality as a barrier to effective corporate governance. But in real life the efforts 
in correcting this situation, if there were any, have been limited. Based on the above 
arguments, agency theory has the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a (agency theory): CEO duality is negatively related to 
performance of a Chinese shareholding company. 
4.4.2 Stewardship Theory Hypothesis 
Stewardship theory joins other strategic management theories in advocating a 
single leadership structure (Davis et al., 1997). The proponents of CEO duality argue 
that the principal issue is both of a clear focus on organizational objective and of a 
umfied leadership (Anderson & Anthony，1986). The debates on board leadership 
structure can largely be seen as a case of competing perspectives - i.e., effective 
monitoring vs. strong leadership (Daily et al., 1997). Anderson and Anthony (1986) 
provided a clear argument for the strong leadership perspective: 
"The reason the positions of chairman and CEO are usually combined is that this provides 
a single focal point for company leadership. There is never any question about who is 
boss or who is responsible." (p.54) 
Several theoretical perspectives propose that CEO duality would promote 
rather than hinder firm performance and these views can be integrated within the 
framework of stewardship theory (Boyd, 1995). In the strategic decision-making 
literature, the researchers have suggested that companies need strong leaders to set 
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strategic objectives and issue unambiguous commands to lower levels (Anderson & 
Anthony, 1986; Finkelstein & Hambrick，1996). Moreover, a CEO-chairman is 
expected to have more knowledge of the company and its environment so that he or 
she could quickly respond to changing environment. Separation of the two positions 
would create conflict within the upper-echelons and hence weaken the firm's abdlity 
to handle its task environment. There has been empirical evidence that the presence 
of constituencies who review a negotiator's actions led to less effective negotiation 
processes (Jackson & King, 1983). In a similar vein, it might be the case that under a 
separate leadership structure, the presence of an independent board chairperson (as a 
reviewer) will actually have negative impact on the CEO's decisiofi-making 
efficiency and effectiveness. The resource dependence researchers argue that CEO 
duality would increase the CEO's discretion and power that are necessary for the firm 
to secure critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik，1978). All these arguments imply one 
thing about the CEO-chairman's behavior: He or she would like to take the decision-
making responsibility and exercise his/her power to the benefit of the firm. 
Stewardship theory suggests that managerial actions would be driven by "a 
much larger range of human motives, including needs for achievement, responsibility, 
and recognition, as well as altruism, belief, respect for authority, and the intrinsic 
motivation of an inherently satisfying task，，(Donaldson, 1990: 372). The theorists in 
this school argue that managers' pro-organizational actions are best facilitated when 
the corporate governance arrangements ensure them high authority and discretion. 
The CEO, as a steward, should be trusted and delegated with unambiguous decision-
making power. The unified command would in turn lead to higher corporate financial 
performance. Muth and Donaldson (1998) clearly explained how stewardship 
theorists view the effect of a combined leadership structure: 
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"The combination of roles provided by CEO duality empowers the CEO and 'stimulates 
the motivation to achieve. The CEO works hard to provide responsible leadership for the 
firm, particularly if the CEO feels bound to the company's future performance because of 
long-term employment. This structure builds trust and empowerment and permits clearcut 
leadership for strategy formulation and implementation. ” (p. 9) 
In the Chinese case, a CEO-chairman would be more committed to improving 
the company's performance and more capable to achieve this objective. The CEO 
would be more likely to take the dual role as a reputation that needs to protect and 
enhance by means of doing a good managerial job. The concern for individual 
reputation would be especially true if considering the generally low monetary rewards 
paid to Chinese managers and the heavy human capital they have already invested in 
their companies. Noticing this disparity between monetary rewards and human capital 
investment, some Chinese researchers suggested that Chinese managers would be 
motivated more through delegation of controlling power (Huang, 2000; Zhou, 1996). 
Unquestionably, most Chinese enterprises are faced with increasing environmental 
uncertainty in the rapid economic reform. The top manager's motivation and 
capability to handle these changes are vital to a firm's success. For an organization 
facing unexpected adverse environmental changes, a CEO-chairman is in a stronger 
position to convey to the outsiders a message that "everything is in control. “ Then 
stewardship theory would predict the effect of CEO duality in the following way: 
Hypothesis 4s (stewardship theory): CEO duality is positively related to 
performance of a Chinese shareholding company. 
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4„5 Chapter Semmary 
The research questions are discussed in this chapter. The main concern of the 
current study is to test for the applicability of two influential corporate governance 
theories - agency theory and stewardship theory in the Chinese context. Consistent 
with previous empirical studies, board composition and leadership structure are 
selected as the key board structural dimensions. Since agency theory and stewardship 
theory conflict with each other in basic assumptions and theoretical propositions, two 
sets of competing hypotheses are developed. The conventional measures of board 
composition are refined to adapt to the institutional characteristics of the boards of 
directors in Chinese firms. Specifically, the distinction between affiliated directors 
and independent directors is made explicit. The affiliated directors in Chinese firms 
are defined as a special group that has unique social relationship with the firm's 
management. It is suggested that the classification schemes developed in Western 
studies are insufficient to capture the institutional background of the corporate 
governance systems currently implemented in Chinese firms. Based on the refined 
three-way classification scheme, hypotheses are proposed regarding the relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of affiliated directors, 
board size, board leadership structure and firm performance. 
' > , . 
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CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY 
5,1 Sample Selection 
The sample for this study was selected from China's listed shareholding 
companies. A brief description of China's stock market and listed companies is given 
in Table 3. By the end of 1998，a total number of 851 shareholding companies were 
listed on either of the two domestic stock exchanges. By the end of 1999 this number 
increased to 949 companies (Chen et al., 2000). The publicly listed companies were 
believed to best serve the purpose of investigating the effects of different corporate 
governance mechanisms. Specifically, the sample included the companies that made 
their initial public offering (IPO) in 1996 at either Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. In 1996，a total number of 207 companies went public; 105 of them listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the other 102 on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange, 1997; Shenzhen Stock Exchange； 1997). These 207 
companies constituted the initial sample. 
Table 3. An Overview of China's Stock Market and Listed Companies 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1 9 9 ^ 
No. of listed companies 
Shanghai 8 8 29 106 171 188 293 383 438 
Shenzhen 2 6 24 77 120 135 237 362 413 
Total 10 14 53 183 291 323 530 745 851 
Market value (100 milliion yuan) “ ^ • 
A'Shares 978 3319 3516 3311 ^449 17154 19299 
B Shares 70 212 175 164 394 375 206 
Total 1048 3531 3691 3474 9842 17529 19506 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1999. "“ ： 
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The year of 1996 was selected as the base year for a number of reasons. First, 
this year saw a record-high number of new listings since 1991 when the two stock 
exchanges were established. As shown in Table 3，during the period of 1990-1995 the 
total number of listed companies was only 323 while in the single year of 1996 the 
new listings amounted to 207. Sufficient observations could be obtained for the 
analysis. Second, it has been generally believed that more reliable corporate 
information could be available from 1996 onward. The information disclosure 
requirements imposed on Chinese shareholding companies had remained loose until 
when the Company Law and a series of regulations regarding information disclosure 
were promulgated (Xiao, 1999). In July 1993，the Ministry of Finance promulgated 
China's first accounting standard, i.e., the Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises ’ which was essentially in line with international accounting standard and 
set the conceptual framework for the disclosure practices of Chinese companies 
(Xiang, 1998). In the same year, the State Council issued the Tentative Regulations on 
the Management of Issuing and Trading of Securities, which contains provisions 
relating to information disclosure. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) also issued the Implementing Rules on Information Disclosure by Public 
Issuing Companies (1993) and the Standards of Contents and Formats of Information 
Disclosure by Public Issuing Companies (No.l, 1994). On January 17 of 1996，the 
CSRC issued a document that required all listed companies to file their annual reports 
in standard format (China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, 1997: 177). 
These regulations and the Company Law of 1994 unquestionably improved the 
disclosure practices of Chinese companies. Considering the lagged effect of legal 
requirements, it was reasonable to treat 1996 as the starting year from then onward 
reliable information could be obtained in standard format from a relatively large 
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sample of listed companies. Third, the sample selection was intended to avoid some 
environmental factors that might have particular impact on the IPO companies' choice 
of corporate governance structure. For example, the governance arrangements of the 
companies that went public in 1997 might be subject to more intervention from the 
state assets management agencies and other government departments due to the 
‘‘zhuada fangxiao” reform policy, which has been actively pursued since 1997. Since 
public offering represents a valuable yet "scarce" (which means that the IPO quota 
has been tightly controlled by the government) funding resource for Chinese 
companies, it was expected that most listed companies belong to the large-enterprise 
category that the state would "take grip of，under the new policy. Inevitably, the asset 
restructuring arrangements of most SOEs have been set under various degrees of state 
intervention. The degree of this political influence depends on the government's 
reform criteria and policy focus at a specific point in time (Liu, 2000). Therefore, the 
state might play a more active role in the process of restructuring the firm's assets and 
determining its ownership structure and board composition under the ''zhuada 
fangxiao“ policy. Moreover, the state intervention might vary across industries and 
I 
regions, which would add more complexity to the relationship betwebn governance 
systems and corporate performance. Finally, the year of 1996 was selected as the base 
year so that the corporate performance data during a longer time of period (1996-
1998) could be collected. 
Further statistical tests were conducted in order to make sure that the sample 
was not significantly different from the other companies that made their IPO in 1995, 
1997 and 1998 in terms of firm size. Here special concern was given to the companies 
that made their IPO after the Company Law was promulgated because the Company 
Law represented a milestone on the Chinese enterprises' way to modem corporate 
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system�The four groups of listed companies, which went public in 1995, 1996’ 1997， 
and 1998 respectively, were compared along the dimensions of total assets and sales 
revenue of 1997 and 1998. The sample of 1996 IPO comjianies was found not 
significantly different from the other three groups of companies on both measures of 
firm size. Moreover, I compared the sample companies that were listed in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and those listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in terms 
of firm size (operationalized as total assets at the time of IPO). No significant 
difference was detected. This ruled out the possibility of regional effect. These tests 
provided evidence that the current sample was representative of the listed companies 
that went public after 1994. -
• - » ... 
The data for the current study were collected from the publicly accessible 
information disclosed by the listed companies. Specifically, the data about the firm's 
board composition,board leadership structure, and background information were 
obtained from its prospectus (zhaogu shuomingshu) and IPO statement (shangshi 
gongkaoshu). The data about financial performance were collected from annual 
reports. 
Four companies had to be deleted from the initial sample because they did not 
provide sufficient information about the background: of each director, which was ‘ .. ‘ 
crucial for coding each director's status and measuring board composition. This left a 
final sample of 203 firms for further data analysis. The sample firms could be 
classified into a variety of industries. Basically, the sample firms distributed in four 
industrial sectors: (1) light manufacturing sector (e.g., textile, apparel, food 
processing, paper products, etc.)； (2) heavy manufacturing sector (e.g., petrochemical, 
chemical materials and products, machinery, metal smelting, transportation 
equipment, electrical equipment, coal mining, etc.)； (3) service sector (e.g., retailing, 
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tourism，hotel, catering, etc.), and (4) public utility (e.g., electricity and natural gas 
supply). The sample was characterized by diversified regional distribution, with 29 
provinces represented in it. The average age of the sample firms was 20.41 years. The 
averaged employment size at the time of IPO was 2261. However, there was large 
» , 
variation in employment size, with the smallest firm hiring only 152 employees and 
the largest one hiring more than 30000 people. 
5.2 Variables and Measurement 
5.2.1 Independent Variables (IVs) 
Board Composition 
The Company Law requires that each IPO firm disclose background 
information of its directors in the prospectus and IPO statement. Most firms in the 
sample disclosed each director's name, gender, educational level, professional title 
(jishu zhicheng), and previous work experience. The prospectus and the IPO 
statement also disclosed information about the focal firm's incorporation process, the 
sponsor(s)，s history and its/their relationship with the focal firm, and the ownership 
structure of the focal firm. 
The board composition variables, i.e., the proportion of independent directors, 
the proportion of affiliated directors, and board size were measured based on the 
directors' background information. The most important task in this respect was to 
ascertain who were affiliated directors by examining the incorporation process of each 
listed company and the background information of each director. The following 
coding scheme was adopted to identify the three types of directors (inside directors, 
affiliated directors, and independent directors). First, the single sponsor or the leading 
sponsor was identified from the description of the incorporating process. Special 
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attention was given to such keywords as "the predecessor of this firm" Cqianshen" or 
“yuan qiye”�’ "the single sponsor of this firm" (“dujia faqiren"), and "the leading 
sponsor of this firm" ("zhuyao faqiren"). It was noted that the founding SOE usually 
had a name similar to that of the shareholding company and got engaged in similar 
lines of businesses. Second, the text describing how the focal firm gathered its share 
capital and the list of the top ten shareholders were carefully examined. The purpose 
was to identify the relationship between the founding SOE and the focal firm. Only a 
founding SOE that continued to operate as an independent business entity and 
appeared on the top 10 shareholder list of the focal firm was coded, and this piece of 
information was further used for determining the list of affiliated directors. Finally, 
Each director's background information was examined. A director who was employed 
by the founding SOE, which had been identified through the above steps, was coded 
as an affiliated director. As described earlier, an inside director was a current 
employee of the focal firm or its wholly owned subsidiaries. The list of the firm's 
wholly owned subsidiaries could be found in the prospectus. An independent director 
came from an outside institution other than the founding SOE and the focal firm. 
The board composition variables were calculated for each firm after the 
coding job was completed. The proportion of affiliated directors was calculated as the 
percentage of affiliated directors in all the directors on a firm's board. The proportion 
of independent directors was calculated in a similar way. Board size was simply the 
total number of directors as reported in the prospectus. The data were obtained from 
一 ‘ 
the prospectus and/or the IPO statement. Most firms reported, in the . prospectus the 
board composition information and employment structure as of the end of 1995. As 
they changed the composition of their boards of directors, most of the sample firms 
disclosed in the annual reports only information about how many directors had quit 
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their board positions and how many were elected during the year. Unfortunately, the 
background information about the newly elected directors was not available in most 
ca ses�TMs made it impossible to code the newly elected directors' status and 
calculate the proportions for the years following the IPO. 
Board Leadership Structure 
Board leadership structure was measured as CEO duality - a dichotomous 
variable. Specifically, the situation in which the CEO and the board chair were the 
same person was coded “1，” and the situation in which the CEO and the board chair 
were two different persons was coded “0.” This information was obtained from the 
prospectus. 
5.2.2 Dependent Variables (DVs) 
There has been no consensus concerning the selection of an appropriate set of 
DVs which account for corporate financial performance (Chakravarthy, 1986). Since 
.... ‘ 
any single performance measure may have its limitation, multiple performance 
measures were used in this study. It was believed that multiple measures would 
produce a more accurate description of corporate performance (Rechner & Dalton, 
1991). Three performance measures were used. The first DV was Return on Assets 
{ROA). This variable was calculated as the ratio of the firm's main business profit 
{"zhuying yewu limn’") to its total assets. The second DV was labeled Adjusted 
Return on Equity (aROE). The formula for this variable is as follows: 
\ • ‘ 
aROE = Net Income * (^狂^^ Business Profit/Gross Profit) Owner's Equity 
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Note that aROE was similar to the conventional measure of ROE, but the 
value of aROE was adjusted by multiplying the ratio of main business profit to gross 
profit. Some Chinese researchers emphasized the importance of focusing on the firm's 
profitability in its main business when studying performance of Chinese companies (J� 
Zhu, 1999). ROA and ROE have been the most widely used performance measures in 
corporate governance studies (Zahra & Pearce，1989). Conventionally, these two 
variables are calculated on the basis of net income (after tax and interest payment). 
They do not reflect the impact of such factors as non-operating income, financial 
leverage, profit structure and tax policy that may be quite different across companies 
and may confound the profitability measures (J. Zhu, 1999). Indeed, net income could 
be "manipulated" by the company. Even the company is losing money in its main 
business, it can make its net income appear to be positive on the financial statements 
by increasing non-operating income (fei yingye shouru) through internal transfers. 
Therefore, net income-based performance measures may not accurately reflect the 
true operational performance, especially in overdiversified companies. It was 
expected that the two adjusted measures used in this study could reflect the firm' level 
of profitability in its main business more accurately. In addition to the two accounting 
measures, there was a third DV ~ Sales per employee (SPE). SPE was calculated as 
the ratio of sales revenue to the total number of employees. It has been suggested that 
non-accounting measures of performance (such as those that capture variations in 
sales, stock prices, and market performance) might show greater board effects (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989). Therefore, SPE was included as a measure of productivity. All the 
three DVs were measured at the end of each year from 1996 to 1998. The data were 
obtained from the annual reports. -
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I did not use stock performance measure in this study, although many 
Western-based studies treated stock market measures as indicator of corporate 
performance. The main reason was that the stock market in China has been 
susceptible to so many non-economic, speculative influential .forces that the stock 
price is largely disconnected from the firm's strategic choice and performance (Young 
& Tan, 1999). The stock performance measures, therefore, may not reflect firm 
performance accurately. 
5.2.3 Control Variables 
Firm age. Most literature on strategic management seems to argue that older 
firms should be more inert than younger ones (Hannan & Freeman，1989). However, 
some researchers argue that older firms would be benefited from their ability to secure 
resources and their industrial experience. Chinese old SOEs are generally 
characterized by both resource advantage and social burden. On the one hand, older 
enterprises may have more government connections and be better at seeking for 
government support. On the other hand, older enterprises suffer more from 
over staffing, heavy social burden, and outdated equipment. Given the uncertainty of 
the relationship between firm age and organizational performance, I included firm age 
as. a control variable. Firm age was measured as the number of,years lapsing from the 
firm's establishment till 1996. 
Firm size. Firm size has been noted for its impact on firm performance (Dalton 
et al., 1999). In the Chinese case, firm size may be a factor that influences the firm's 
selection of asset restructuring mode and incorporation process. Firm size was 
measured in two ways, in consistence with previous research (Borch & Huse，1993; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1992). The first variable was the number of employees and the 
86 
• • 、‘ 
second was the company's total assets. The data were collected from the prospectuses. 
Because of the skewness of data I took natural logarithm of the original measures. 
The transformed data were then used in regression analyses. Specifically, I used Firm 
size I (natural log of employment size) in the two regression models about ROA and 
AROE, and Firm size 2 (natural log of total assets) in the regression model about 
SPE. Since it was inevitable that employment size was negatively related to SPE, 
other things being equal, I used total assets as an alternative measure of firm size in 
order to avoid estimation bias. 
Ownership structure. The ongoing ownership reform in China may impact on 
performance of shareholding corporations. Two variables regarding ownership 
structure were measured in this study. State ownership was calculated as the 
percentage of state shares in the total number of outstanding shares as reported in the 
IPO statement. Legal person ownership was calculated as the percentage. of legal 
person shares in the total number of outstanding shares. 
Industry. The performance norms may be different across industries. In the 
current study the sample firms came from a variety of industries. A dummy variable 
was used to control for the possible industry effect. The manufacturing industries 
(including both heavy and light manufacturing industries) were coded as “1” while the 
non-manufacturing industries (including service industries and public utility 
industries) were coded as “0.” 
Directors, shareholding. It is noted that in-some Chinese companies the 
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directors have been rewarded with a certain proportion of corporate shares. Thus the 
incentive effect of share ownership may be present in Chinese companies, too. 
However, the director ownership scheme, as a reward system, is still in its infant stage 
in China. Not only the average number of shares granted to the directors has been 
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very small, but also the trading of the director-held shares is under strict legal 
regulations. Considering these factors, I used directors' shareholding as a control 
variable in this study. In many Chinese firms, independent directors also got stock 
award from the corporation. Independent directors ’ shareholding was measured as the 
percentage of all the shares owned by the firm's independent directors in the total 
number of outstanding shares. Similarly, affiliated directors，shareholding was 
measured as the percentage of all the shares owned by—the firm's affiliated directors in 
the total number of outstanding shares. The data were obtained from the IPO 
statement. 
» 
5.3 Data Analysis 
The multiple regression technique was applied to test the hypotheses. A series 
of tests were conducted for each DV. In each set of regression analyses, the baseline 
model (Model 1) was first tested for its predictive power. Then, the IVs (board 
composition and leadership structure) were introduced-into the full model (Model 2). 
In the full model the joint effect of the board variables on the performance variable 
was tested. Each regression model was examined based on the value of R^ change ~ 
an indicator of the incremental predictive power of the newly added IVs over the 
baseline model. A significant regression coefficient for a specific IV was another 
indicator that the IV has significant effect on the DV. 
In the first set of regression tests, the 1996 performance variables were 
regressed on the control variables and the IVs. The data from all the 203 sample firms 
were used in these tests. The three performance variables were labeled ROA96, 
aROE96, and SPE. There has been no consensus in previous literature regarding the 
lagged performance effect. How long would be appropriate time lapse for observing 
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and measuring the performance effect of a set of predictors? Researchers have been 
arguing on this issue and it seems that no unanimous answer has come out. It is 
suggested in this study that the judgment about time effect should be dependent on 
specific environmental conditions under which the researchers conduct empirical 
studies. The Chinese reform context has been characterized by rapid environmental 
changes. The other side of the same coin is that the top decision makers of the firms 
have enjoyed increasing discretion in deciding how to respond to the changing 
situations. It is expected that a certain board design would impact on firm 
performance in a relatively short period of time. In 伍is study, the data about board 
composition and leadership structure were obtained from the prospectus and the IPO 
statement. The IPO data actually described the board structure as of late 1995 or early 
1996. Most firms had completed corporatization in the early 1990's, usually a few 
years before IPO. In these firms, the board directors had been working with the firm 
for a relatively long time. Therefore, the performance variables that were measured at 
the end of 1996 could reflect the lagged effect of the board design variables. 
Nevertheless, the performance effect during a longer period of time was also tested. 
The second set of regression analyses were conducted to this end, in which the 
average performance values during the 1996-1997 period were regressed on the 
control variables and IVs. It has been a common practice in previous studies to use the 
average performance over a certain period to capture the effect of the corporate 
governance variables (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Wagner et al., 1998). Since the data on the 
employment size were not available in 1997, the third DV (SPE) was not used in the 




However, it was noted that the practice of taking the 2-year average of 
performance values might overlook the dramatic performance change that had been 
caused by the factors external to the board-performance relationships of interest. In 
addition to the regression tests based on the full sample, a series of diagnostic 
analyses were made in order to identify the extraordinary cases. The outlier cases, if 
any, are worth particular attention not only because their presence may distort the 
regression estimations (Hair et al., 1998) but also because the way in which they 
deviate from the other cases should be examined carefully based on both quantitative 
and qualitative data. First, it was important to identify the firms that had experienced 
"abnormal" performance fluctuations during the studied period before each firm's 
performance was averaged over years. The abnormaf performance fluctuation might 
be caused by some events that were particular to a specific firm but not generally 
observed in the other sample firms. Or it could be attributed to some particular 
characteristics of the firms in question that appeared to be extraordinary when 
compared with other sample firms. Whichever situation should be judged on the basis 
of not only quantitative data but also specific contextual information provided in the 
firms' annual reports. In the current study, I calculated the rate of change of the 
performance variables over the 1996-97 period (see Appendix C) and identified four 
f i m s that showed dramatic performance fluctuation. To identify the substantive 
causes for this performance fluctuation, I examined the annual reports of the four 
firms. It was revealed that three of them (stock code: 600708，600711，and 600735) 
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diversified their businesses across a wide range of industries. In fact, the percentage 
of main business profit in gross profit was extremely low in the three firms. The three 
firms also shared another feature: They all suffered huge loss in their main line of 
business. Two of them initiated large-scale asset stripping in 1997. Moreover, all the 
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three firms belonged to the fourth mode of asset restructuring 一 "co-sponsor 
restructuring", which was described in Chapter 3. As mentioned earlier, this mode of 
asset restructuring has been less observed among Chinese listed.compames around the 
year of 1996. So it was suggested that the removal of these three firms from the data 
analyses should not impact on the representativeness of the sample. As for the fourth 
firm (stock code: 0669) that experienced dramatic performance decrease, the 
examination of its annual reports disclosed that it suffered from an abnormal 
suspension of production in 1997. It was noted that in 1997 the firm's utilization of its 
production capacity was merely 5.75% of its normal level. The main cause was that a 
large sum of special-purpose project loan was not transferred to the firm on schedule. 
This firm was also removed from the following data analysis because the performance 
reduction due to the abnormal suspension of production was not a typical event for 
other firms. 
Second, the outliers in the context of the regression estimations were 
identified. Following Hair et al.，s suggestions (1998)，I identified two other firms as 
outliers from various perspectives (univariate, bivariate, and multivariate). First, the 
standard scores of all the metric variables (both IVs and DVs) were examined in order 
to identify the cases that had extremely high values丄 Then, I examined the partial 
regression plots for the outliers in bivariate regression relationships. In these plots, the 
outliers could be readily seen. Finally, I checked the values of studentized residuals, 
cook's distance, COVRATIO, and SDFFIT for outlier cases. These measures were 
used to identify multivariate outliers. The tests were repeated for each DV. With care 
I identified only the cases that appeared to be extraordinary in all the above tests. The 
stock codes of the two outlier cases were 600888 and 600761 respectively. 
: . ... ‘ 
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A streamlined sample of 197 firms was left after the above six outlier firms 
were removed from ihtfull sample of 203 firms. In the following sections, regression 
results based on both samples will be reported. 
Since the IVs were correlated to each other, the multicollinearity might be 
present in the data set. I examined the extent of multicollinearity among the IVs by 
using the data from both the fall sample and the streamlined sample. First, the 
correlation matrix was examined. No sign of substantial collinearity was found 
because the correlations among the IVs were all below .50. Then, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of each predictor was examined. The VIF measure indicates the 
degree to which each IV is explained by the other IVs and large VIF values denote 
collinearity. A common cutoff threshold is a VIF value of 10 (Hair, et al., 1998). An 
examination of all the VIF values in my regression tests indicated that 
multicollinearity was not a serious problem. I used still another method to examine 
the degree of multicollinearity, i.e., checking the condition index for each predictor in 
each regression model. The condition index represents the collinearity of 
combinations of variables in the data set and the most commonly used threshold value 
is 30 (Hair, et al., 1998). These tests did not reveal serious problem, either. The above 
tests were conducted in each regression model. Overall, multicollinearity was not a 
serious problem in this study. 
I also regressed the performance values of 1998 on the board variables, but the 
‘ 
result was poor. It could be attributed to various factors. For one thing, a 3-year time 
lapse might be too long for examining the governance effectiveness in Chinese firms, 
especially when the period involved was characterized by rapid environmental 
changes (e.g., the Asian financial crisis in 1997) and radical policy initiatives. For 
another, most sample firms saw changes in their ownership structure, board 
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composition and leadership structure during this period. With all these uncertainties, it 
might not be surprising that the regression results about the 1998 performance were 
poor. 
In the next chapter, the results from the regression analyses based on both the 
M l sample (N 二203) and the streamlined sample (N = 197) are reported. Corporate 
performance was measured at the end of 1996 and as the 2-year average of the 1996-
97 period. ‘ 
I ‘ 
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CHAPTER 6, RESULTS 
6 � 1 Results based on the Full Sample (N=:203) 
Descriptive statistics based on the full sample of 203 firms were presented in 
Table 4. For the sample companies, the number of directors ranged from a low of 5 to 
a high of 19 with an average board size about 10. The proportion of affiliated 
directors to total directors averaged .16，ranging from a low of 0 (no affiliated 
directors) to a high of .88. Comparatively, the proportion of independent directors 
ranged from 0 to .95, with an average of .31. In the 203 sample firms, 107 firms had a 
combined leadership structure, accounting for 57.6%. The positions of the CEO and 
the board chairperson were separated in the other 86 firms (42.4%). This finding was 
consistent with the anecdotal notes about the predominance of CEO duality in 
Chinese firms. 
As shown in Table 4，firm age was positively related to state ownership (r == 
.28), which was consistent with the general impression that the state control was 
higher in older enterprises. Further evidence in this regard was offered by the negative 
correlation between firm size (operationalized as the number of employees) and the 
proportion of independent directors (r 二 -.22). It seemed that old and large companies 
had fewer independent directors on their boards. Also, as the board size .increases, 
there is higher possibility for more independent directors to be selected to the board, 
other things being equal. Table 4 showed a positive relationship between board size 
and the proportion of independent directors (r = .25). Independent directors' 
shareholding was negatively related to firm size (r = -.22)，which implied that in 
larger firms the independent directors held fewer shares. This negative correlation 
between firm size and independent directors' shareholding wa�consistent with what 
was observed in US corporations (Bhagat et al., 1999). Meanwhile, it seems that 
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independent directors in non-manufacturing firms had higher level of ownership 
interest (r = -.21). As for the affiliated directors' shareholdings, a surprising finding 
was that this variable had significant, positive relationship with four but of the five 
D V s � G i v e n its tentative and experimental nature, the infant-stage director 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5�Results of Regression Analysis (Full Sample - 1) 
r o A 96 aROE 96 STO 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
(Baseline) (Full) (Baseline) (Full) (Baseline) (Full) 
Control variables: 
Firm age �07 .01 ，03 -.03 -�05 -,07 
们 。 �a -.08 -.02 -.01 .07 .35*** .36*** Firm size ^ -
State ownership .03 .05 .01 ‘03 , -.08 -.04 
Legal person ownership 03 .05 .01 .04 -.02 .00 
Industry .18* .16* .18* .17* -.15* -.16* 
Independent directors' shareholding -.05 -.03 -.03 -.01 .05 .04 
Affiliated directors' shareholding .27*** .24** .29*** .28*** .06 .01 
Independent variables: 
Proportion of independent directors .02 .08 .13卞 
Proportions of affiliated directors .16卞 .17* .21* 
Board size -.20** -.23** -.16* 
CEO duality .14t .18* .08 
p value 1 8 4 ^ 3.70*** 4.04*** 4.25*** 5.94*** 4.90*** 
R square .12 .18 .13 .20 .18 .22 
R square change .06* .04* 
Values shown are the standardized regression coefficients. N = 203. 
a. Firm size = natural logarithm of employment size for ROA 96 and AROE96; Firm 
size = natural logarithm of total assets for SPE. 
卞 < . 1 0 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 6 �R e s u l t s of Regression Analysis (Full Sample - 2) 
‘ ROA mean aROE meao 
Model 1 Mode! 2. Model 1 . Model 2 
(Baseline) (Full) (Baseline) (Fuil) 
Control variables: 
Firm age .02 -.03 .03 .01 
Firm size a -.08 - 0 4 - 0 7 -.04 
State ownership .05 .06 -.01 .01 
Legal person ownership -02 ,03 -.01 .01 
Industry .14 1 .08 .08 
Independent directors' shareholding -.05 _.03 ‘ _.03 , -.03 
Affiliated directors' shareholding .18* .17* . 17* . 17* 
Board variables: 
Proportion of independent directors -.01 
Proportions of affiliated directors .08 .07 
Board size -.15* -.10 
CEO duality .10 .14卞 
F value L ^ LSS 1^23 
R square .06 .10 .04 .01 
R square change .03 .03 
Values shown are the standardized regression coefficients. N 二 203. 
a. Firm size = natural logarithm of employment size. 
卞 p < . 1 0 一 
* p < .05 ‘ 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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The proportion of independent directors was negatively related to the 
proportion of affiliated directors (r 二 -.36). It seemed to signal the existence of a 
trade-off between the two mechanisms. When a firm chooses to increase the 
proportion of independent directors, it probably will reduce the proportion of 
affiliated directors. Similarly, the proportion of affiliated directors was negatively 
related to CEO duality (r = -.43). 
The results of the regression analyses were displayed in Table 5 and Table 6. 
Table 5 showed the results of the three regression models regarding the performance 
measures of 1996 (ROA96, aROE96, and SPE). It was noted that the industry dummy 
variable appeared to have significant effect on corporate performance. The 
manufacturing firms performed better than the non-manufacturing firms in terms of 
ROA and aROE; however, the former did worse than the latter in terms of sales per 
employee. The result was understandable because in China the manufacturing 
industries have been faced with more severe overstaffmg problem than the non-
manufacturing industries, which would have negative impact on performance of the 
manufacturing enterprises if the performance measure had to do with the employment 
size. However, care should be taken when interpreting the industry effect because a 
dummy variable was only a rough proxy for capturing this effect. Another surprising 
result was the consistent positive effect of affiliated directors' shareholdings on ROA 
and aROE. Previous studies on Chinese firms seem to agree that the . incentive 
compensation plans, if any, have little effect on firm performance (e.g., Chen, et al., 
2000; Wu, et al., 1998). This unexpected finding will be further discussed in the final 
chapter. 
The proportion of independent directors was only marginally correlated to 
sales per employee (b = .13，significant at .10 level) and it did not have significant 
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effect on the accounting performance measures, although the signs of the beta 
coefficients were consistent with the agency theory hypothesis ( H I a ) � T a k e n as a 
whole, Hla was not supported. The stewardship theory hypothesis about negative 
performance effect of the proportion of independent directors (His) was not 
supported, either. Stewardship theory suggests that more affiliated directors would 
help improve corporate performance (H2s), while agency theory holds opposite 
hypothesis (H2a). The results in Table 5 showed that H2s were supported across the 
three performance measures (b = .16 for ROA96; b = .17 for aROE96; b 二 .21 for 
SPE). In other words, the affiliated directors seemed to have played a positive role in 
improving the firm's performance. In contrast, the prediction based on agency theory 
did not find empirical support. The stewardship hypothesis about board size stated 
that there would be a negative relationship between board size and corporate 
performance (IBs). This hypothesis was supported because board size consistently 
showed negative relationship with corporate performance (b 二 -.20 for ROA96; b = -
.23 for aROE96; b 二 -.16 for SPE). Taken together, it was the stewardship theory 
hypotheses about the board composition - performance relationship that obtained 
substantial support (except for the proportion of independent directors). 
CEO duality was used to describe the board leadership structure in this study. 
The standard agency theory prediction is that CEO duality would lead, to poor 
corporate performance (H4a). Stewardship theory, on the contrary, suggests that firms 
with a combined leadership structure would have better performance (H4s). As shown 
in Table 5, CEO duality had a positive effect on aROE96 at a significant level (b = 
.18). It was also marginally related to ROA96 in the direction as predicted by 
stewardship theory (b 二 .14). No significant relationship was found between CEO 
duality and sales per employee, but the sign of the beta coefficient was consistent with 
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the stewardship theory hypothesis. Therefore, H4s was marginally supported while 
H4a was not supported. All the three full models demonstrated significant r 2 change 
over the baseline model, which indicated that the board variables, as a whole, 
significantly improved the predictive power of the regression models. 
Table 6 displayed the regression results when the DVs were the 1996-97 
average performance values. It was observed that the signs of the beta coefficients 
were basically the same as in Table 5. However, the overall impact of the corporate 
governance variables on performance was not significant. The relationship between 
board size and ROA was significant, as predicted by stewardship theory. The r 2 
change values were not significant when the average performance values were 
regressed on the IVs. As mentioned above, one possible cause for this phenomenon 
was the extraordinary performance fluctuations experienced by some sample firms. 
The regression results in Table 6 might be influenced by the outliers. Thus, further 
analyses were conducted based on the data from the streamlined'sample'. 
6.2 Results based on the Streamlined Sample (N = 197) 
The regression tests described in the previous section were repeated in the 
streamlined sample. The descriptive statistics were shown in Table 7. The pattern of 
the correlations was similar to that observed in Table 4，which provided primary 
evidence that the streamlined sample was not significantly different from the full 
sample in terms of the relationships in which this study^ was interested. 
Table 8 and Table 9 showed the regression results. Note that the six outliers 
were identified mainly according to performance change from 1996 to 1997. The step 
for examining performance change was necessary when the performance effect over a 
longer period of time was taken into consideration. Given the statistically significant 
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results regarding the 1996 performance measures in the fiill sample, it was argued that 
the pattern should not change much in the streamlined sample. Indeed, Table 8 and 
Table 5 showed similar pattern of regression estimations. To be specific, the data set 
from the streamlined sample also supported the stewardship theory hypotheses about 
the proportion of affiliated directors (H2s) (b 二 .19 for ROA96; b 二 .19 for aROE96; 
b = ,21 for SPE) and board size (IBs) (b = -.24 for ROA96; b 二 -.27 for aROE96; b 二 
-.16 for SPE). The stewardship theory prediction about the positive effect of CEO 
duality was partially supported because the beta coefficient for CEO duality was 
significant when aROE of 1996 was used as the DV (b 二 .16). The proportion of 
independent directors had a marginally significant positive relationship with, sales per 
employee (b= .13)，which offered weak support for the agency theory hypothesis 
(HI a). Viewed as a whole, substantial empirical support went to 
stewardship theory. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8�Resu l t s of Regression Analysis (Streamlined Sample --1) 
“ r o A 96 aROE 96 SPE 
Model 1 Mode! 2 Model 1 Model 2 Mode! 1 Model 2 
(Baseline) (Full) (Baseline) (Full) (Baseline) (Full) 
• ..., • 
Control variables: 
Firm age .05 -.03 .01 -.06 -.05 -.07 
Firm size a � 1 2 - 0 4 - 0 4 -06 -35*** \36*** 
State ownership .20 .11 .06 .08 -.08 -.04 
Legal person ownership .07 .08 .03 .06 -.02 -00 
Industry .18* .15* .18* .16* -.15* -.16* 
Independent directors' shareholding -.07 -.03 -.04 -.02 .05 .04 
Affiliated directors' shareholding .30*** .27*** .33*** .30*** .06 .01 
Independent variables: 
Proportion of independent directors -.01 .06 .13"f" 
Proportions of affiliated directors .19* .19* .21* 
Board size -.24** — -.27*** -.16* 
CEO duality .11 .16* • .08 
F value 4.92*** 5.02*** 4.83*** 5.32*** 5.94*** 4.90*** 
R square .15 .23 .15 .24 .18 .22 
R square change .08** .09*** . -04* 
Values shown are the standardized regression coefficients. N = 197. 
a. Firm size = natural logarithm of employment size for ROA 96 and AROE96; Firm 
size 二 natural logarithm of total assets for SPE. 
t ；7 < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < ,01 
*** p < .001 
1 0 4 一 
Table 9. Results of Regression Analysis (Streamlined Sample - 2) 
ROA mean aROE mean 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
(Baseline) (Full) (Baseline) (Full) 
Control variables: 
Firm age -.02 -.08 -.01 -,06 
， a -.13 -.08 -.09 -.03 Firm size ^ . 
State ownership .11 .12 .05 .06 
Legal person ownership .06 .07 .00 .03 
Industry .16* .15* .12 .11 
Independent directors' shareholding -.07 -.04 -.05 -.0'4 
Affiliated directors' shareholding .21** .19* .21** .20** 
Independent variables: 
Proportion of independent directors -.03 .05 
Proportions of affiliated directors .09 .09 
Board size -20** -.21** 
CEO duality .08 .12 
F value 2：84^  ^ ^ 
R square .09 .14 .07 .12 
R square change .05* ‘ .05* 
Values shown are the standardized regression coefficients. N = 197. 
a. Firm size == natural logarithm of employment size. 
卞 p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
Table 9 illustrated how the board variables impacted on the firms' average 
ROA and aROE. As predicted by stewardship theory, the smaller the board of 
directors, the better the firm's performance (b = -.20 for ROA; b = -.21 for aROE). 
This finding was consistent with H3s but not with HJa. However, the positive effect 
of the proportion of affiliated directors disappeared in these tests. 
A summary of the hypothesis testing results based on the streamlined sample 
was shown in Table 10. Overall, the empirical evidence was mixed, although it 


























































































































































































































CHAPTER 7�DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
» ? 
7,1 Discussion 
The main concern of the present study was the relationship between board 
structure (composition and leadership structure) and corporate financial performance� 
In this study, I first developed a classification scheme to measure board composition 
in Chinese firms. Drawing upon two influential corporate governance theories -
agency theory and stewardship theory, I proposed two sets of competing hypotheses 
about the relationship between board composition / leadership structure and corporate 
performance. The hypotheses were first tested in a sample pf 203 Chinese listed 
companies and then in a streamlined sample of 197 companies. 
Three performance measures were used to capture the concept of firm 
performance. Two of them (ROA and aROE) belong to the most widely used 
accounting performance measures. Accounting performance measures have been 
criticized for their susceptibility to managerial manipulation. This concern may be of 
special relevance to the Chinese listed companies that had usually gone through a 
complicated asset restructuring process before going public. In this study, I tried to 
minimize the possible "artificial" performance effect caused 'by manipulation and 
focused on the firm's profitability in its main business. The argument was that 
manipulation was often done by means of increasing non-business profit, which 
would influence net income but not profit from the firm's main business. Therefore, 
the firm's profitability in its main business is a more accurate and persistent measure 
of its performance. Besides the accounting performance measures, a productivity 
measure (sales per employee) was also included in this study. The use of multiple 
performance criteria would make the hypothesis testing more convincing. In order to 
1 0 7 
provide a more powerliil empirical test, the lagged performance effect was taken into 
account and two sets of DVs reflecting different time effects were used in this study� 
Despite the arguments in the management studies on how to capture the time effect of 
certain managerial practices (Bergh, 1993)，the use of multiple times of observations 
was believed to be a better design. 
Three of the four stewardship hypotheses received support of various degrees. 
Board size was found across all the performance measures to be negatively associated 
with firm performance. The proportion of affiliated directors was found to be 
positively associated with firm performance when performance was measured at the 
end of 1996. These results were consistent with the predictions of stewardship theory. 
The stewardship theory hypothesis about CEO duality also received empirical support 
to some degree. However, the stewardship hypothesis about the, proportion of 
independent directors was not supported. In comparison, the hypotheses based on 
agency theory did not find empirical support in most cases. The only exception was 
the proportion of independent directors, which was found to be marginally associated 
with sales per employee. In summary, a better performing Chinese company appeared 
to have a smaller board and more affiliated directors. The firm's leadership structure 
seemed to influence its performance not so strikingly as the representation of 
affiliated directors. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the firms with the positions 
of CEO and board chair assumed by the same person perforined better than those 
firms with the two positions assumed by different persons. 
Some findings warrant further discussion. In the first place, the ownership 
structure (state and legal person shareholdings) was found to have little effect on 
performance of Chinese firms, which seems inconsistent with the general impression 
that the SOEs perform poorly. This inconsistency can be attributed to several factors, 
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however. First, previous studies claiming that SOEs perform poorly often compared 
the SOEs (most of which were traditional ones), as a whole, with the non state-owned 
enterprises such as township and village enterprises (TVEs), private enterprises, and / 
or foreign-invested enterprises (e.g., Perotti, Sun, & Zou，1999). But the present study 
was focused on the shareholding companies that were transformed from SOEs. The 
performance effect was evaluated on a "within-group comparison'' basis. Many 
causes for SOEs' poor performance that have been discussed in previous literature, 
including heavy social burden and direct government intervention, have become less 
relevant since the SOEs stripped off their non-productive, bad-performing assets and 
adjusted their relationships with the government under the Company Law. The 
assertion that state ownership leads to bad performance becomes somehow 
oversimplified when the comparison is made within shareholding corporations but not 
between a broad-term state-owned sector and other non state-owned sectors. Second, 
the state ownership averaged at 23 percent in the sample firms. This, relatively low 
level of state ownership suggests that the state control in Chinese companies has been 
"diluted." An immediate consequence of China's ownership diversification reform 
has been the decrease in the state ownership (Liu, 2000). Thus the effect of 
concentrated state ownership might diminish in this diversification process. In this 
study no substantial relationship between legal person ownership and performance 
was found. This might be due to the fact that a Chinese shareholding company 
typically has more than one legal person shareholders, who are different in their 
influential power on the company. ‘ 
The second interesting finding is that the proportion of independent directors 
had little bearing to firm performance, despite the observation that the average 
proportion of independent directors in the sample firms was much higher than that of 
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affiliated directors. On the surface the sample firms showed an effort in seating more 
independent directors on their boards, following the popular belief in the Anglo-
American corporate governance model. However, the effect of such a practice 
appeared to be dubious. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is the positive relationship between 
affiliated directors' shareholding and firm performance. An equally interesting finding 
is the lack of effect of independent directors' shareholding. These results should be 
interpreted carefully. It appears that the directors' personal ownership, interest in the 
firm did produce incentive effect, which is consistent with the agency proposition. 
Although the affiliated directors' share ownership was of very small scale, its 
incentive effect was tremendous in China where stock investment was once totally a 
foreign thing to the public. However, it is known that China's stock market has been 
volatile and the directors' shareholdings are subject to strict regulation. If the stock-
related incentive scheme motivated the affiliated directors, I speculate that this 
incentive effect takes the form of a strong belief that personal wealth could be realized 
through improved corporate performance in the long run. By' contrast, if the stock 
award did not produce the same incentive effect on the independent directors, it might 
be due to the independent directors' lack of psychological commitment to the 
company. It is this long-term concern for linking personal wealth with organizational 
wealth that may serve as a linkage between the incentive mechanisms proposed by 
agency theory and stewardship theory respectively. Therefore, the finding about 
directors' shareholding raises the question about the complementarity between the 
two theories with respect to the incentive-oriented governance devices. In the Chinese 
context, it seems that extrinsic incentive schemes would motivate the organizational 
members in an impressive way if they were “matched” with organizational designs 
1 1 0 
that enhance organizational commitment and collective goals (e.g., an affiliated 
director-dominated board). ‘ 
On the whole, the findings of this study were mixed. Comparatively speaking, 
the support for agency theory hypotheses was weak. However, the problem is perhaps 
not with agency theory itself, but with the fact that China has not established an 
adequate institutional framework that meets the assumptions of agency theory. At 
present, the questionable applicability of agency theory in China can be explored at 
both the macro- and the micro-levels. The concern at the macro-level is mainly related 
to the institutional framework. For the ideal corporate governance model proposed by 
agency theorists to work effectively and efficiently, a variety of preconditions must be 
satisfied. These preconditions are actually the institutions that support a market 
economy, including legal frameworks defining property rights, private- contract 
regimes, fiduciary liability, dispute resolution mechanisms, credit-rating and 
consumer protection services, independent accounting and legal professional and so 
on (Gray, 1996). Of special importance is the existence of a competitive stock market, 
a managerial labor market, and a market for corporate control (Ma, 1997). However, 
China obviously does not have these accompanying economic conditions and social 
I  
institutions for the stylized corporate governance model to work (Tarn, 2000). In the 
agency theory framework, the stock market is supposed to serve as an efficient 
information system in which the stock price would be interpreted as a signal of firm 
performance. The board of directors can easily know about the managers' 
performance by keeping an eye on the firm's stock price. This information function of 
the stock market is very limited in the Chinese case because a large portion of 
corporate shares (state shares and legal person shares) is still prohibited from freely 
trading on the secondary market. Thus the information content of the stock price in • • ‘ 
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Chinese stock market is insufficient for the corporate directors, especially the outside 
directors, to use as reference. In other words, the fragmented stock market makes the 
infomation asymmetry problem a practical barrier for the outside directors to perform 
their role. In the view of the current study, the affiliated directors enjoy the precious 
information advantage over the independent directors, which should be an important 
reason for their positive influence over the corporate outcomes. 
The second important institution 一 managerial labor market - is also absent in 
today's China. Agency theory supposes that managers would be "bound" to the 
shareholders' interests for fear of losing their job to other qualified candidates whom 
the board of directors may recruit from the external managerial labor market. This 
competitive pressure is hardly the case for most Chinese top managers. Without such 
an institutional control over managerial behavior, the managers'' "self-control" and the 
social control from the affiliated directors, which stems from the social relations 
embedded in the governance device rather than from formal institutions, become more 
important. Unfortunately, agency theory largely overlooks managers' facilitative 
effort in improving corporate performance and the social exchange between the 
managers and the directors (Barkama, 1995; Nilakant & Rao, 1994). 
The market for corporate control has been underdeveloped in China, too. 
According to agency theory, the takeover serves as a corrective response to managers' 
moral hazard. Since in most takeover cases the managers lose their jobs and a poor-
performing firm is more likely to become the target for takeover, the managers are 
under pressure to work hard in order to improve firm performance and keep their own 
jobs. As an external governance mechanism, the market for corporate cotnrol 
complements the internal governance mechanism such as the board of directors. 
Without this external mechanism, it would be a more demanding job for the directors 
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to monitor the managers. At least the directors are faced with more challenging work 
in processing and analyzing information about the managers' ability and effort. The 
affiliated directors may be in a better position in filling this "information gap." In one 
word, given the absence or underdevelopment of the above-mentioned external 
institutions, the ways in which the board of directors is selected and the directors 
perform their functions might be more complicated than what, are described in agency 
theory. 
The status quo of the corporate governance systems in Chinese firms has to be 
viewed in such an environment where the institutional conditions for the stylized 
corporate governance model are underdeveloped and where the regulators encourage 
the firms to copy the stylized model. This complexity appears to be more vivid if we 
move our lens of scrutiny down to the micro-level, i.e., within the firms that are being 
corporatized. At this level, agency theory might be insufficient due to its unrealistic 
assumptions and oversimplified propositions about the role of the board of directors. 
For example, agency theory assumes that the critical effectiveness that the boards of 
directors generate derive from reducing agency cost (Rindova, 1999). What are 
overlooked include the directors' knowledge, expertise, information, experience and 
other cognitive and social resources. All these resources are vital to improve the 
firm's decision-making quality and performance. Agency theory emphasizes that 
independence should be the most desirable board attribute. In this way it overlooks 
the resources that the affiliated directors are more likely to bring to the firm. 
An important implication of this study is that additional theoretical 
perspectives should be applied to address the complexity of corporate governance 
issues in transition economies. Although previous literature has attempted to cast 
stewardship theory in direct opposition to agency theory, what was found here seem 
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to suggest that stewardship theory could be viewed as a perspective that complements 
agency theory with its more realistic descriptions about human incentives and 
governance processes. Stewardship theory enriches the governance literature by 
attentively examining the subtle behavioral differences among different types of 
directors. Moreover, stewardship theory helps us better understand the corporate 
governance issues in the Chinese context by directing our attention to collectivist 
culture, interpersonal relationship (guanxi), social relations, and other context-
sensitive factors that have been overlooked or oversimplified in formal agency 
literature. Particularly, this study revealed some important things about the 
representation of the affiliated directors on Chinese boards. Such affiliated 
directorship seems to be a real governance mechanism with "Chinese characteristics." 
It fits into China's current institutional framework properly. And the present study 
revealed that such a "local" governance mechanism did impact on firm performance 
positively. As discussed earlier, while agency theory stresses formal institutional 
control mechanisms, stewardship theory pays more attention to the affiliated 
directors' superior capability in maintaining positive working environment and 
facilitating strategic decision-making at the firm's top level. Perhaps that is why 
stewardship theory showed more predictive power than did agency theory in this 
study. The findings were not that unexpected, however, because previous researchers 
have pointed out that various approaches to corporate governance that have been 
experimented in China might lead to different effectiveness outcomes. Specifically, 
some researchers suggested that the SOE efficiency would be improved if its "owner" 
were designated as an enterprise or an enterprise group rather than a government 
agency or a SAHC (Liu, 1998). Under the corporatization program, if may be a more 
realistic choice for China to grant the enterprise groups with the owner's power 
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instead of creating intermediate SAHCs (Aoki, 1999). Closely related to the present 
findings was the empirical evidence that the Chinese listed companies whose asset 
structure was transformed under a "main-body restructuring" mode performed better 
than other companies (reported in Shao, 2000). As discussed earlier, a firm reformed 
under a "main-body restructuring" mode tended to have more affiliated directors. The 
rationale was that an enterprise would perform better than a government body in 
managing the state assets. This study took a step further along this line of thinking and 
explored the governance dynamics within the enterprise. 
The possible trade-off relationship among alternative governance mechanisms 
— ‘ • 
is.another interesting issues that emerged from this study. It was noted,that the IVs in 
this study were correlated with one another in some particular ways. The proportion 
of independent directors was negatively related to the proportion of affiliated, directors 
at a significant level. Similarly, the proportion of affiliated directors was negatively 
related to CEO duality. These findings seem to imply a trade-off effect between 
alternative governance mechanisms. Namely, one mechanism may substitute the 
other. For example, according to stewardship theory, when a firm already has a 
greater proportion of affiliated directors, it may not need a CEO-chair at the same 
tifne. Because CEO duality has often been seen as a consequence of the CEO's 
victory in the "power struggle" between the board and the CEO, it may not be a 
necessary arrangement if the CEO and the affiliated director-dominated board could 
work things out in a trusting and cooperative environment. By contrast, according to 
stewardship theory, an effective governance mechanism would be characterized by 
CEO duality if the CEO-board relationship were not so smooth (e.g., in the case that 
the board is dominated by independent directors). The latter pattern was not observed 
in the current sample, though. CEO duality appeared to have virtually no relationship � 、.‘ • * ？ 
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with the proportion of independent directors. Perhaps in Chinese firms the affiliated 
directors are more powerful than the independent directors in influencing the design 
of the board leadership structure. It is worth exploring the possible trade-off effect 
between different governance mechanisms in future research., Previous researchers 
have discussed the interaction effect or interdependence among different corporate 
governance mechanisms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Rediker & Seth, 1995). The 
implication is that the ultimate performance effect is dependent upon a "synthesis" of 
alternative governance devices. This study highlighted the performance effect of 
individual governance mechanisms. Further research is needed to explore the specific 
ways in which the firms choose among different board designs. 
7;2 Limitations ‘ 
Admittedly, this study is subject to a number of limitations. In the first place, 
the study is cross-sectional by nature. Although lagged performance effects are 
considered, the board variables are measured at only one point in time. The empirical 
evidence might reflect only the situation in the initial years following the IPO. It is 
less clear whether or not the affiliated directors' positive influence on firm 
performance would persist over a longer period of time. Future research could 
evaluate nature of this relationship by measuring the board variables and firm 
performance over several intervals and then applying longitudinal analytical 
techniques. 
The second limitation is the data source. The use of objective data' makes it 
possible to study a large sample of firms and reduce measurement error that is 
generally inherent of subjective measures. Additionally, the objective information 
disclosed by listed companies is considered reliable because all the financial data are 
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audited by independent accounts and auditors before being filed with the CSRC. 
However, the secondary data are limited in contextual richness and in-depth 
disclosure of the firms' dynamic situation. Without systematic examination of these 
contextual factors, the present study might be under the threat imposed by 
"unmeasured variables" (Baron & Kenny, 1986)，although all empirical research 
designs have to face this problem. . 
This study applied a demographic approach to studying the characteristics of 
boards of directors. To be specific, the study focused on the structural characteristics 
of the board of directors. Since Pfeffer (1983) first introduced the demographic 
approach to the management research, it has gained increasing popularity in such 
research areas as corporate governance and top management team. The demographic 
approach emphasizes the composition of a social entity in terms of its members' 
attributes and argues that the demographic characteristics could reflect the 
unobservable psychological and social processes (Pfeffer/ 1983>. Despite its 
straightforwardness and theoretical parsimony, this approach has been criticized for 
its sacrifice of theoretical relevance for methodological ease, explanatory power for 
predictive accuracy, and insightful description for simplified prescription (Priem, 
Lyon, & Dess，1999). Although previous sociopsychological studies have established 
the linkage between demographic characteristics and subjective processes (see e.g., 
Tsui & Gutek，1999)，it is recognized that the rationale for why subjective concepts 
can be replaced by demographic variables is not clearly delineated (Lawrence, 1997). 
The value of this study may be that it revealed the empirical evidence about the effect 
of the structural characteristics of the board and offered possible theoretical 
explanations of the underlying processes and dynamics within the boards o f directors. 
Future research is thus needed to further investigate the "black box" between the 
1 1 7 
demographic characteristics and firm performance outcomes from the theoretical 
perspectives discussed in this study. 
Finally, the current study caught a snapshot of the corporate governance 
systems now at work in typical Chinese listed companies. It was a snapshot of a 
transitional governance pattern in which the selection of independent directors was 
more likely to be made under legitimate "pressure" whereas the selection of affiliated 
directors represented a realistic choice for the sake of securing strategically important 
resources. It remains an issue whether these governance .arrangements are an 
expedient measure used to fill up the "governance vacuum" temporarily or indigenous 
governance practices that suit local cultural and institutional contexts dynamically. 
Longitudinal research is necessary for exploring this issue. 
7.3 Conclusion and Future Research Direction 
Despite the claimed importance of the board of directors as a corporate 
governance mechanism, the empirical research on board composition and leadership 
sthicture has produced mixed findings. Agency theory has dominated this field of 
research for decades, however, there has been a growing interest in alternative 
theories. This study made two contributions to corporate governance research. First, a 
new approach to classifying board members was proposed. The new classification 
scheme considers China's institutional context and gives special weight to the most 
important players who have shaped the corporate governance structure in Chinese 
firms. Second, competing hypotheses based on agency theory and stewardship theory 
were proposed. Board composition was suggested to impact board incentive and 
capability. The major findings, which were basically consistent with stewardship 
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theory, were eye-catching. However, largely consistent with agency theory, the 
directors' shareholdings were found to have positive performance effect. 
The findings may have important implications for both academic research and 
the governance reform practices in Chinese companies. For the policy makers and 
practitioners, a take-home message is that the director ownership scheme helps align 
the directors' interest with the shareholders'. This finding may imply a practical 
solution to the "multi-level agency problem" that has disturbed the transition 
economies. Perhaps granting shares to the directors and managers is a more effective 
governance device than simply creating intermediary agencies to represent the state. 
Who sit on the board of directors largely determines how effectively the board 
can work for the organizational goals. Currently, Chinese firms are encouraged to 
increase the representation of outside directors. However, this agency logic overlooks 
the fact that China does not have accompanying institutions to guarantee the selection 
of motivated and capable directors and managers from an external labor market. The 
external pressure from the stock market and the corporate control market is also too 
weak to maintain effective corporate governance. But the collectivist culture and the 
social resources embedded in the longtime employment system imply that governance , » 
could be realized through social exchanges and other arrangements that nurture 
interpersonal trust and collective effort. The positive influence of affiliated directors 
fits into this picture. An implication of this study is that the relationship between the 
affiliated directors and the managers has its special values for China's fledgling 
shareholding companies. The affiliated directors not only help keep the business 
continuity of the shareholding company through their resource links and expertise but 
also help maintain trust and open-mindedness at the top level of the firm. In a culture 
that treasures interpersonal harmony and long-term cooperation, it is expected that the • ‘ 
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affiliated directors are more able to create and nurture these facilitative conditions. In 
the real world, certainly there should be more alternative structural designs that help 
enhance the trast-based governance process. 
For academic researchers, especially those who are interested in the corporate 
governance issues in Chinese firms, this study indicates several potential research 
directions. For example, an interesting line of inquiry is to systematically examine the 
cognitive and behavioral differences among different types of directors. The possible 
mediating factors include group cohesiveness, cooperation, communication, 
interpersonal trust, in-group/out-group identification, and so on. A fruitful avenue of 
research is to reveal the psychological and cognitive resources (or lack of them) that 
different directors bring to the board and how these-resources would influence the 
, • ‘ 
board process. In the Chinese context, the particularly interesting mediating factors 
may be "face" and "guanxi" mechanisms. It is suggested that these two mechanisms 
would have significant impact on the relationship among directors and between 
directors and managers. The previous studies have seldom examined these 
mechanisms in the corporate governance context. 
Another meaningful research direction is to identify in which situations 
agency theory and stewardship theory may contradict and in which situations they 
may complement each other. The present study showed that the two theories are 
countervailing as far as the design of board composition is concerned, but they 
converge with respect to the design of financial incentive scheme for the directors. 
However, careful studies are needed to explore more specific contextual factors in this 
regard. 
1 2 0 
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